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STATE AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT 
IRAS AFTER THE TRUMP ELECTION: 
ARE THEY PREEMPTED BY ERISA? 
Kathryn L. Moore* 
In recent years, a number of states have sought to close the retirement savings funding 
gap by enacting legislation mandating that employers that do not sponsor a voluntary 
pension plan for their employees automatically enroll their employees in a state-
administered IRA program. This Article focuses on the most serious legal challenge 
these programs face: ERISA preemption. 
The Article begins by providing an overview of the state automatic enrollment IRA 
programs. It then discusses a regulatory safe harbor created for these programs in 2016 
and disapproved under the Congressional Review Act in 2018. It then turns to the 
question whether, in the absence of the safe harbor, state automatic enrollment IRAs are 
preempted by ERISA. In addressing this question, it considers two subsidiary issues: 
(1) whether state automatic enrollment IRA programs are employee benefit plans for 
purposes of ERISA and thus preempted by ERISA, and (2) even if state automatic en-
rollment IRA programs are not employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA, whether 
the state law creating these programs nevertheless relates to other employee benefit 
plans so as to be preempted by ERISA. Finally, the Article considers the merits of two 
complaints that have been filed challenging state automatic enrollment IRA programs. 
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I. Introduction 
The United States faces a serious retirement savings funding gap.1 
Although estimates of the magnitude of this problem vary,2 there is vir-
tually uniform agreement that retirement savings in the U.S. are inade-
quate,3 and that people of color face particularly severe challenges in 
preparing for retirement.4 In recent years, a number of states have 
sought to close this gap by enacting legislation mandating that employ-
ers who do not sponsor a voluntary pension plan for their employees 
automatically enroll their employees in a state-administered Individual 
Retirement Account (“IRA”) program.5 This Article focuses on the most 
serious legal challenge these programs face: ERISA preemption. Section 
514(a) of ERISA (the Employee Retirement Income Security Act) 
preempts “any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter 
relate to any employee benefit plan.”6 Whether the state laws mandat-
ing the automatic enrollment IRAs are preempted by ERISA has been a 
hotly contested issue. 
 
 1. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-419, RETIREMENT 
SECURITY: MOST HOUSEHOLDS APPROACHING RETIREMENT HAVE LOW SAVINGS 7 
(2015) (finding, among other things, that about half of households age fifty-five and 
older have no retirement savings). 
 2. See, e.g., ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., NATIONAL RETIREMENT RISK INDEX 
SHOWS MODEST IMPROVEMENT IN 2016, CENT. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOS COLL. 5 
(2018) (discussing the National Retirement Risk Index which shows that 50% of 
working households are “at risk” of being unable to maintain their present standard 
of living in retirement); Jack VanDerhei, Auto-IRAs: How Much Would They Increase 
the Probability of “Successful” Retirements and Decrease Retirement Deficits? Preliminary 
Evidence from EBRI’s Retirement Security Projection Model, 36 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INS. 
NOTES, 11, 19–20 (2015) (estimating retirement savings shortfalls in present value (in 
2014 dollars) at age sixty-five of $36,387 (per individual) for those ages sixty to sixty-
four and $54,120 for those ages thirty-five to thirty-nine for an estimated aggregate 
national retirement deficit of $4.13 trillion for all U.S. households where head of 
household is between thirty-five and sixty-four years of age).  
 3. See Daniel Shaviro, Multiple Myopias, Multiple Selves, and the Under-Saving 
Problem, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1215 (2015) (discussing the reasons why individuals “un-
der-save.”).  
 4. See, e.g., NARI RHEE, RACE AND RETIREMENT INSECURITY IN THE UNITED 
STATES, NAT. INST. ON RET. SEC. (2013), https://www.nirsonline.org/reports/race-
and-retirement-insecurity-in-the-united-states. 
 5. California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§§ 100000–100044 (West 2018); Connecticut Retirement Security Exchange, CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 31–418 (2018); Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 820 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 80/1–95 (2018); Maryland Small Business Retirement Savings Program 
and Trust Act, MD. CODE ANN., LAB & EMPL. §§ 12-201 to -502 (West 2018); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 178.215 (2018). 
 6. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2018). 
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Recognizing the vulnerability of these programs to an ERISA 
preemption challenge, the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued a 
final regulation, effective October 31, 2016, which provided that a state 
automatic enrollment IRA program does not constitute an employee 
benefit plan for purposes of ERISA if it satisfies eleven separate require-
ments.7 The regulation was relatively short-lived. Shortly after the 
Trump election, Representative Tim Walberg introduced House Joint 
Resolution 66 disapproving the regulation.8 The House Joint Resolution 
was later passed by both the House and the Senate and ultimately 
signed into law by President Trump on May 17, 2017.9 The Department 
of Labor removed the regulation from the Code of Federal Regulations 
on June 28, 2017 “[b]ecause the resolution[] invalidated the final 
rule[].”10 
This Article considers whether state automatic enrollment IRA 
programs are preempted by ERISA. Section II provides an overview of 
the state automatic enrollment IRA programs. Section III discusses the 
regulatory safe harbor and its subsequent disapproval under the Con-
gressional Review Act. Section IV analyzes the question of whether, in 
the absence of the safe harbor, state automatic enrollment IRAs are 
preempted by ERISA. In addressing this question, Section IV also dis-
cusses two subsidiary issues: (1) whether state automatic enrollment 
IRA programs are employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA and 
thus preempted by ERISA, and (2) even if state automatic enrollment 
IRA programs are not employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA, 
whether the state laws creating these programs nevertheless relate to 
other employee benefit plans so as to be preempted by ERISA. Finally, 
Section V briefly considers the merits of two complaints that have been 
filed challenging state automatic enrollment IRA programs.  
  
 
 7. Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Em-
ployees, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,464 (Aug. 30, 2016). 
 8. H.J. Res. 66, 115th Cong. (2017).  
 9. H.J. Res. 66, Pub. L. No. 115-35, 131 Stat. 848 (2017).  
 10. Definition of Employee Benefit Plan Under ERISA, 82 Fed. Reg. 29,236 (June 
28, 2017). 
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II. Overview of State Automatic Enrollment IRA 
Programs 
Currently, five states—California,11 Connecticut,12 Illinois,13  Mar-
yland,14 and Oregon15—have enacted legislation creating state auto-
matic enrollment IRA programs.16 A number of other states are also 
considering establishing automatic enrollment IRA programs.17 Alt-
hough the state programs differ in many of their details, they share 
some similar purposes and provisions.18  
First, and most importantly, all of the programs are intended to 
provide a workplace retirement savings program for individuals who 
would not otherwise have access to such a program. Because the pro-
grams are only intended to cover workers who would not otherwise 
have access to a workplace retirement savings program, they do not 
cover employers that offer their employees a retirement plan.19 Thus, 
 
 11. California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§§ 100000–100044 (West 2018).   
 12. Connecticut Retirement Security Exchange, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31–418–427 
(2018). 
 13. Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 80/1–
80/95 (2018). 
 14. Maryland Small Business Retirement Savings Program and Trust Act, MD. 
CODE ANN., LAB & EMPL. §§ 12-201 to -502 (West 2018).   
 15. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 178.200-178.245 (2018). 
 16. Two other states, New Jersey and Washington, have enacted legislation to 
establish a marketplace to provide for a voluntary program. See New Jersey Small 
Business Retirement Marketplace Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:23 (West, 2018); Wash-
ington Small Business Retirement Marketplace Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 43.330.730–750 (West 2018). 
 17. See, e.g., Missouri Secure Choice Savings Program Act, HB 1672, 99th Gen. 
Assemb., 2d. Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018). In the spring of 2018, New York Governor An-
drew Cuomo signed a budget bill that includes a voluntary state IRA program for 
private-sector employees. See also James T. Madore, NY private-sector employees to re-
ceive retirement savings plans NEWSDAY (April 2, 2018, 8:00PM), https://www.news-
day.com/business/private-retirement-savings-new-york-1.17828511. This program 
differs fundamentally from the other state automatic enrollment IRA programs be-
cause it is voluntary—employers may decide whether to offer the plan to their em-
ployees.   
 18. See Comparison of Retirement Plan Design Features, By State: California, Illinois, 
Oregon, and Washington, GEO. U. MCCOURT SCH. OF PUB. POL’Y CTR. FOR RETIREMENT 
INITIATIVES (Sept. 30, 2015), https://cri.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/11/CRI-State_Comparison-Chart-FINALtoweb11-11-15.pdf (providing for a 
more detailed comparison of the plan design features).  
 19. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-422(a)(4) (2018) (providing that qualified 
employer is exempt if it otherwise maintains a retirement plan or retirement ar-
rangement); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/5 (2018) (limiting definition of employer to 
person or entity that has not offered qualified retirement plan in the preceding two 
years); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 12-101(d)(2)(v) (West 2018) (excluding from 
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for example, the California law provides that “[a]n employer that pro-
vides an employer-sponsored retirement plan . . . shall be exempt from 
the requirements of the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings 
Program, if the plan . . . qualifies for favorable income tax treatment un-
der the Federal Internal Revenue Code.”20  
Second, all of the programs are designed as automatic enrollment 
programs in order to maximize voluntary participation. A host of stud-
ies show that participation rates are higher in automatic enrollment 
401(k) plans than in 401(k) plans in which workers must affirmatively 
opt in to participate.21 Drawing on this insight from behavioral econom-
ics, all of the programs are structured so that workers are automatically 
enrolled and must affirmatively opt out of participation if they do not 
want to participate in the program.22 For example, California’s statute 
provides that “[e]ach eligible employee shall be enrolled in the program 
unless the employee elects not to participate in the program.”23 
Because all of the programs provide for automatic enrollment, 
they must necessarily provide for a default contribution rate. The pro-
grams differ in the default contribution rate or how the rate is to be 
established, or both. Connecticut’s statute sets the default contribution 
rate at 3% of compensation.24 California’s statute also sets the default 
 
definition of covered employer “an employer that currently offers an employer-of-
fered savings arrangement that was established separately from the requirements 
of this title”); OR. REV. STAT. § 178.215(8) (2018) (requiring Oregon Retirement Sav-
ings Board to establish process for employer to obtain exemption if employer offers 
a qualified retirement plan).   
 20. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(g)(1) (West 2018). 
 21. See Kathryn L. Moore, Closing the Retirement Savings Gap: Are State Automatic 
Enrollment IRAs the Answer?, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 35, 64-68 (2016) [hereinafter 
Moore] (discussing studies). 
 22. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-419(a)(4) (2018) (directing the Connecticut 
Retirement Security Authority board of directors to establish “the process by which 
a participant may opt out of the program by electing a contribution level of 
zero . . . .”); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 80/60(b) (2018) (providing that “Employers shall 
automatically enroll in the Program each of their employees who has not opted out 
of participation in the Program . . . .”); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 12-205(d)(1) 
(2018) (directing the Board to “establish procedures for: a covered employee to opt 
out of participation in the Program . . . .”); OR. REV. STAT. § 178.215 (2018) (directing 
the Oregon Retirement Savings Board to adopt “procedures for automatic enroll-
ment of employees and for employees to opt out of the plan.”).   
 23. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(f)(1) (West 2018). 
 24. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-416(3)(B) (2018). 
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contribution rate at 3% of wages, but authorizes the California Invest-
ment Board to adjust the default rate to between 2% and 5%.25 Illinois’ 
law charges the Illinois Board with selecting a default contribution rate 
between 3% and 6% of wages,26 while both Maryland’s and Oregon’s 
laws task the implementing boards with establishing a default contri-
bution rate without such constraints. 27 Currently, the Maryland Board 
has not yet established a default contribution rate,28 while the Oregon 
Board has set the initial contribution rate at 5% with auto-escalation at 
the rate of an additional 1% each year until a maximum contribution of 
10% is reached.29  
Just as each program must necessarily provide for a default con-
tribution rate, all of the programs must also establish a default invest-
ment. Again, the programs differ in the selection or method of selecting 
the default investment. Connecticut’s statute provides for a default in-
vestment in “an age-appropriate target date fund that most closely 
matches the participant’s normal retirement age, rotationally assigned 
by the program.”30 Illinois’ statute also provides for “a life-cycle fund 
with a target date based upon the age of the enrollee” as the default 
investment option.31 Unlike Connecticut’s law, however, Illinois’ law 
authorizes the Illinois Board to establish a “secure return fund whose 
primary objective is the preservation of the safety of principal and the 
provision of a stable and low-risk rate of return,”32 and provides that if 
the Board elects to establish such a fund, the Board must determine 
whether that fund should replace the life-cycle or target date fund as 
the default investment option.33 
 
 25. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(i), (j) (West 2018). The regulations provide for a 
default initial contribution rate of 5% with automatic escalation of 1% each year until 
it reaches 8%. CAL. CODE REGS, tit 10, chp. 15, §10005(a)(1) & (2) (Nov. 19, 2018). 
 26. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 80/30(o-5) (2018). The default contribution was set 
at 5%. See Contributions, ILL. SECURE CHOICE, https://saver.ilsecurechoice. 
com/home/savers/contributions.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2019). 
 27. MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 12-403(f) (West 2018); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 178.210(1)(d) (2018). 
 28. Cf. Maryland$aves—Your bridge to a secure financial future, MARYLAND$AVES, 
http://www.marylandsaves.org (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) [hereinafter Mary-
land$aves] (stating that the “Maryland Program will arrange for a selection of pri-
vately-managed investment options, with a default option if an employee doesn’t 
want to choose.”).  
 29. OR. ADMIN. R. 170-080-0030(1)(a) (2018).   
 30. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-423(b) (2018).   
 31. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 80/45(a) (2018).   
 32. Id. at § 80/45(b)(3).   
 33. Id. at § 80/45(c).   
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Maryland’s law charges the Maryland Board with evaluating and 
establishing a range of investment options, including a default invest-
ment.34 Oregon’s law gives the Oregon Board the power to “direct the 
investment of the funds consistent with the investment restrictions es-
tablished by the board.”35 This legislation requires the Oregon Board to 
exercise prudence in establishing investment restrictions that are con-
sistent with the objectives of the plan,36 and prohibits guaranteeing any 
rate of return or interest rate.37 The Oregon Board’s regulations provide 
for a default investment of the first $1,000 of contributions in a capital 
preservation investment with the remainder invested in a target date 
fund.38 California’s statute directs the California Board to “establish 
managed accounts invested in United States Treasuries, myRAs, or 
similar investments” for up to the first three years following implemen-
tation of the program.39 During this three-year period, the California 
Board is directed to “develop and implement an investment policy that 
defines the program’s investment objectives” and permits the objec-
tives to be met in a prudent manner.40 
Some, but not all, of the programs exclude small employers from 
coverage. Specifically, the California and Connecticut programs ex-
clude employers with fewer than five employees,41 while the Illinois 
program excludes employers with fewer than twenty-five employees.42 
In contrast, the Maryland and Oregon programs do not exclude small 
employers;43 although the Oregon program provides for delayed im-
plementation with larger employers subject to the mandate sooner than 
smaller employers.44 
Generally, the programs require that the state agency implement-
ing the program design employee information packets about the pro-
 
 34. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 12-204(a)(8) (West 2018).   
 35. OR. REV. STAT. § 178.205(2)(c) (2018).   
 36. Id. 
 37. OR. REV. STAT. § 178.210(2) (2018).   
 38. OR. ADMIN. R. 170-080-0030(1)(a)(C) (2018). 
 39. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100002(e)(1)(A) (West 2018). 
 40. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100002(e)(2)(A). The California Board adopted the In-
vestment Policy Statement on May 21, 2018. The statement is available at https:// 
www.treasurer.ca.gov/sub/regulations/investments-policy-statement.pdf.  
 41. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100000(d)(1); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-416(7) (West 2018). 
 42. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 80/5 (2018). 
 43. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 12-101(d)(2) (West 2018); OR. ADMIN. R. 
170-080-010(2)(k).   
 44. OR. ADMIN. R. 170-080-0015(1)(b) (2018).   
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gram, including information on employees’ rights and program fea-
tures. The packets are to be disseminated directly to employees45 or to 
employers who are required to distribute the information to employ-
ees.46  
California was the first state to enact automatic enrollment IRA 
legislation.47 Specifically, the California Secure Choice Retirement Sav-
ings Trust Act was signed into law in September 2012.48 The California 
program, however, was not immediately effective. Instead, the Califor-
nia law established the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings In-
vestment Board49 and authorized a comprehensive feasibility study to 
determine whether an automatic enrollment IRA program was feasible 
in California.50 The market analysis and feasibility study, which found 
the program to be “feasible, sustainable, and legally permissible,”51 was 
issued on January 31, 2016.52 On September 29, 2016, legislation ap-
proved the program and required the California Board to begin devel-
oping the program as of January 1, 2017.53 Regulations were adopted in 
November 2018,54 and the first employers registered in a pilot phase of 
the program in November 2018.55  
 
 45. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, chp. 15, § 10003(c) (West 2018).    
 46. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-419 (2018); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 80/55 
(2018); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 12-205 (West 2018); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 178.215(9) (2018). 
 47. Kathryn L. Moore, A Closer Look at the IRAs in State Automatic Enrollment 
IRA Programs, 23 CONN. INS. L. J. 217, 219 (2016).  
 48. California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§§ 100000–100044 (West 2018). 
 49. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100002. 
 50. OVERTURE FIN. LLC., CALIFORNIA SECURE CHOICE MARKET ANALYSIS, 
FEASIBILITY, STUDY, AND PROGRAM DESIGN CONSULTATION SERVICES 5 (Mar. 17, 
2016), https://www.treasurer.ca.gov/scib/report.pdf [hereinafter OVERTURE FIN. 
REPORT].  
 51. See Letter from Cal. Secure Choice Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd., to Hon. Kevin de Leon, 
President pro Tempore of Cal. State Senate (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.treas-
urer.ca.gov/scib/recommendations/senate.pdf.  
 52. See OVERTURE FIN. REPORT, supra note 50. 
 53. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100046 (West 2018). 
 54. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, chp. 15, (West 2018), available at https:// 
www.treasurer.ca.gov/sub/regulations/amended-regs-20181119.pdf. 
 55. CalSavers Retirement Savings Program, Making Workplace Retirement 
Savings Possible for 7.5 Million Californias, available at https://www.treas-
urer.ca.gov/sub/fact.pdf.  
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In January 2015, Illinois became the first state to fully enact legis-
lation establishing a state automatic enrollment IRA program, the Illi-
nois Secure Choice Savings Program (“Illinois Secure Choice”).56 Illi-
nois Secure Choice was initially slated to go into effect on July 1, 2017.57 
On June 30, 2017, the Illinois legislature amended the law to provide for 
enrollment of employees to begin in 2018.58 On May 15, 2018, the pilot 
phase of Illinois Secure Choice went into effect with ten to fifteen em-
ployers volunteering to register at that time.59 The first phase of the full 
program went into effect in November 2018 with employers with 500 
or more employees enrolling in the program at that time.60 The second 
wave for employers with 100 to 499 employees and the third wave with 
employers with twenty-five to ninety-nine employees are scheduled to 
go into effect in July 2019 and November 2019, respectively.61  
On June 25, 2015, Oregon became the third state to enact state au-
tomatic enrollment IRA legislation,62 and in 2017, OregonSaves became 
the first state automatic enrollment IRA program to go into effect.63 Spe-
cifically, the pilot phase of the program went into effect in July 2017,64 
 
 56. Jamie Hopkins, Illinois Enacts Automatic IRAs: Is Federal Mandate Coming?, 
FORBES (Jan. 7, 2015, 5:35 PM) https://www.forbes.com/site/jamiehopkins/ 
2015/01/07/automatic-enrollment-iras-first-government-mandate-automatic-iras-
is-enacted-in-illinois/#15740ead290c.  
 57. See id. (“However, the program will not become effective until at least July 
2017.”).  
 58. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/60 (2018).   
 59. David B. Brandolph, Illinois Launches Automatic IRA Pilot Program for Private 
Sector (Corrected), BLOOMBERG L., https://bnanews.bna.com/employee-benefits/il-
linois-launches-automatic-ira-pilot-program-for-private-sector-corrected (last up-
dated May 16, 2018, 11:57 AM).   
 60. See A New Choice for Retirement Savings, ILL. SECURE CHOICE RETIREMENT 
SAVINGS PROGRAM, https://employer.ilsecurechoice.com/ (last visited Apr. 1, 
2019).   
 61. Joy M. Napier-Joyce, et al., What Employers Need to Know about the Illinois 
Secure Choice Mandatory Retirement Savings Program, JACKSON LEWIS (Aug. 13, 2018), 
https://www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/what-employers-need-know-about-
illinois-secure-choice-mandatory-retirement-savings-program.   
 62. Act of June 25, 2015, 2015 Or. Laws ch. 557§ 2 (page 1) (codified as amended 
at OR. REV. STAT. § 178.215 (2018)). 
 63. Greg Iacurci, Oregon will help other states launch own auto-IRA programs, INV. 
NEWS (Dec. 17, 2018, 4:50 PM), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/ 
20181217/FREE/181219940/oregon-will-help-other-states-launch-own-auto-ira-
programs. (“Oregon became the first state to automatically enroll workers without 
access to a 401(k) or similar plan into an individual retirement account, with money 
contributed via payroll deduction. The state launched the program OregonSaves, in 
July 2007.”). 
 64. Eleven businesses began to register and identify improvements to the sign-
up procedure software in July 2017. The second phase of the pilot program took 
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and the first regular wave of registrations for employers with more than 
100 employees went into effect in November 2017.65 Five additional 
waves of registrations are scheduled with the sixth and final wave of 
employers with four or fewer employees scheduled to go into effect on 
May 15, 2020.66 As of July 1, 2018, more than 32,000 employees had en-
rolled in OregonSaves.67 In 2016, Maryland68 and Connecticut69 became 
the fourth and fifth states to enact laws establishing automatic enroll-
ment IRA programs. In late 2018, the chair of the Connecticut Retire-
ment Security announced that it would begin implementing the pro-
gram in January 2019 in phases modelled after the OregonSaves 




effect in October 2017 when forty-two additional employers began to register. See 
OREGONSAVES ANNUAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE at 7, 13 (2017), http://www. 
oregon.gov/treasury/Newsroom/Topics%20of%20Interest/2017%20Oregon-
Saves%20Annual%20Report.pdf. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  
 67. See John Manganaro, One Year In, Assessing the Progress of OregonSaves, 
PLAN SPONSOR (July 6, 2018), https://www.plansponsor.com/one-year-assessing-
progress-oregonsaves/.  
 68. See Maryland Small Business Retirement Savings Program and Trust, MD. 
CODE ANN., LAB & EMPL. § 12-101 to -502 (West 2018). 
 69. An act creating the Connecticut retirement security program, SHB 5591, 
2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2016). 
 70. Maura Mastrony, Connecticut to Implement Mandatory IRA Program SOC’Y 
FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/resources 
andtools/legal-and-compliance/state-and-local-updates/pages/connecticut-to-
implement-mandatory-ira-program.aspx. 
 71. See Maryland$aves, supra note 28. 
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III. The 2016 Regulatory Safe Harbor and Its 
Subsequent Disapproval 
Originally enacted in 1974, and amended multiple times since 
then, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)72 
regulates “employee benefit plans.”73 Among other things, ERISA im-
poses reporting and disclosure requirements,74 vesting75  and funding76 
rules, and fiduciary provisions77 to protect plan participants.   
Section 4(a) of ERISA provides that ERISA generally applies to 
any “employee benefit plan” established or maintained by an employer 
“engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting com-
merce” or any plan established or maintained by unions representing 
employees engaged in commerce. 78 Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts 
“any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to 
any employee benefit plan.”79 Thus, if state automatic enrollment IRA 
programs create employee benefit plans under ERISA, ERISA preempts 
the state law creating the programs and the law may not be enforced. 
Given the importance of this issue, the Illinois law directed the 
Illinois Board to request a determination from the Department of Labor 
as to the applicability of ERISA to the Program80 and prohibits the 
Board from implementing Illinois Secure Choice “if it is determined 
that the Program is an employee benefit plan and State or employer 
liability is established under the federal Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act.”81 California’s law includes a similar admonishment.82 
Similarly, Maryland’s law directs the Maryland Small Business Retire-
ment Savings Board “to take any action necessary to ensure that the 
 
 72. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 
93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).   
 73. See ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2018).   
 74. See ERISA §§ 101–105, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021–1025 (2018). 
 75. ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2018). 
 76. ERISA §§ 301–305, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081–1085 (2018). 
 77. ERISA §§ 401–413, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1113 (2018). 
 78. ERISA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2018). 
 79. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2018). 
 80. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 80/95 (2018) (“The Board shall request in writing an 
opinion or ruling from the appropriate entity with jurisdiction over the federal Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act regarding the applicability of the federal 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act to the Program.”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100043 (West 2018). 
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Program is not preempted by federal law;”83 while the Oregon law re-
quires the Oregon Board to obtain legal advice about the applicability 
of ERISA to the plan before establishing the Oregon program.84 
On May 18, 2015, twenty-six U.S. Senators, including the ranking 
members of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and 
Pensions and the Senate Finance Committee, sent a letter to President 
Barack Obama encouraging the President to take action as soon as pos-
sible to facilitate state automatic IRA programs.85 Among other things, 
the Senators requested the President to ask the DOL to clarify that the 
California and Illinois and similar Programs are not “plans” subject to 
ERISA.86  
At a White House Conference on Aging on July 13, 2015, President 
Obama announced that the states would have clarity on the issue by 
the end of 2015.87 That same day, referring to President Obama’s di-
rective,88 Secretary of Labor Perez announced that the Department of 
Labor would issue guidance that would “safeguard worker retirement 
savings and offer pathways for states to adopt retirement savings pro-
grams that are consistent with federal law.”89 The DOL released the 
promised guidance on November 18, 2015, in the form of a proposed 
regulation which created a safe harbor for savings arrangements estab-
lished by states for non-governmental employees.90 The proposed safe 
 
 83. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 12-204(c) (West 2018). 
 84. OR. REV. STAT. § 178-230(b) (2018).   
 85. Letter from Patty Murry et al., to President Barack Obama (May 18, 2015), 
http://sd24.senate.ca.gov/sites/sd24.senate.ca.gov/files/5-18-15%20Let-
ter%20to%20President%20Obama.pdf. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Hazel Bradford, Clarity on state-run private-sector retirement savings coming 
by year-end, BUS. INS., (July 14, 2015), http://www.businessinsurance.com/arti-
cle/20150714/NEWS03/150719940.  
 88. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: The White House Con-
ference on Aging (July 13, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 
2015/07/13/fact-sheet-white-house-conference-aging. 
 89. Tom Perez, Clearing a Path for State Based Retirement Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. 
BLOG (July 13, 2015), http://blog.dol.gov/2015/07/13/clearing-a-path-for-state-
based-retirement-plans/.  
 90. Savings Arrangements Established by State for Non-Governmental Em-
ployees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,006 (proposed Nov. 18, 2015) (proposing a regulation that 
would establish a safe harbor excluding from the definition of plan under ERISA 
certain state payroll deduction savings programs including automatic enrollment 
IRA programs); Interpretive Bulletin Relating to State Savings Programs That Spon-
sor or Facilitate Plans Covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,936 (proposed Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 
570) (setting forth DOL guidance regarding state marketplace approach, state-spon-
sored prototype plan approach, and state multiple employer plan approach). 
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harbor,91 which received about seventy comments,92 was modestly 
amended and finalized in a final regulation published on August 30, 
2016.93 Under the final regulation,94 state automatic enrollment IRAs 
would not constitute employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA if 
they met eleven separate requirements.95 A companion rule extending 
the safe harbor to qualified state political subdivisions was published 
on December 20, 2016.96  
Shortly after the Trump election, Representative Tim Walberg in-
troduced House Joint Resolution 66 disapproving the 2016 regulatory 
safe harbor.97 The resolution was passed in both the House98 and the 
Senate99  and ultimately signed into law by President Trump on May 17, 
2017.100 The DOL removed the 2016 regulatory safe harbor from the 
 
 91. For ease of reference, the proposed regulation will be referred to as the 
“proposed 2016 regulatory safe harbor,” even though the proposed regulation was 
issued in 2015. 
 92. See Moore, supra note 21, at 52. 
 93. Savings Arrangements Established by State for Non-Governmental Em-
ployees, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,464 (proposed Aug. 30, 2016). 
 94. For ease of reference, the final regulation will be referred to as the “2016 
regulatory safe harbor.” 
 95. Savings Arrangements Established by State for Non-Governmental Em-
ployees, 81 Fed. Reg. at 59,464, 59,476–77; Savings Arrangements Established by 
Qualified State Political Subdivisions for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. 
Reg. at 92,639.  
 96. Savings Arrangements Established by Qualified State Political Subdivi-
sions for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. at 92,639. 
 97. Representative Francis Rooney introduced House Joint Resolution 67 dis-
approving the companion rule extending the safe harbor to qualified State political 
subdivisions. That House Joint Resolution was passed by the House and the Senate 
and ultimately signed by the President on April 13, 2017. 163 CONG. REC. H1206–
1218 (Feb. 15, 2017). 
  Representatives Walberg and Rooney contended the regulations would 
force workers into government-run IRAs without the consumer protections pro-
vided by ERISA. The representatives cited concerns that the regulations would “dis-
courage small businesses from offering private-sector plans and leave working fam-
ilies with less retirement security, inadequate safeguards, and limited control over 
their retirement savings.” See WOLTERS KLUWER, INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT PLANS 
GUIDE LETTER NO. 424 (2017) [hereinafter INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT PLANS GUIDE 
LETTER NO. 424]. 
 98. 163 CONG. REC. H1206–1218 (Feb. 15, 2017). 
 99. 163 CONG. REC. S2692–2712 (May 3, 2017). The resolution passed in the Sen-
ate 50-49 with two Republican senators, Senators Corker and Young, voting against 
it. See Roll Call 115h Congress-1st Session, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/leg-
islative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=115&session=1&vote 
=00120 (last visited Apr. 1, 2019). 
 100. H.J. Res. 66, Pub. L. No. 115–35, 131 Stat. 848 (2017).   
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Code of Federal Regulations on June 28, 2017 “[b]ecause the [resolu-
tion] invalidated the final [rule].”101 This joint resolution of disapproval 
was made pursuant to the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”).102 En-
acted in 1996, the CRA provides an expedited procedure103 for Con-
gress to overturn agency regulations.104  
The CRA generally provides that before an agency rule can take 
effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a report regard-
ing the rule to both houses of Congress and the Comptroller General of 
the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”).105 Congress then has 
sixty session or legislative days106 after the date the agency submits its 
report of the rule to pass a joint resolution of disapproval and present 
the resolution to the President.107 If the joint resolution is passed by both 
houses of Congress and signed by the President, the rule shall not take 
effect.108 Moreover, if a rule does not take effect, it “may not be reissued 
in substantially the same form, and a new rule that is substantially the 
same as such a rule may not be issued, unless the reissued or new rule 
 
 101. Definition of Employee Pension Benefit Plan Under ERISA, 82 Fed. Reg. 
29,236 (June 28, 2017).  
 102. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104–121, 110 Stat. 871, Title II, Subtitle E (1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 
(2018)).   
 103. For a detailed discussion of the expedited procedure, see RICHARD S. BETH, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL31160, DISAPPROVAL OF REGULATIONS BY CONGRESS: 
PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (2001).   
 104. In order to meet the requirements set forth in Immigration & Naturalization 
Service v. Chadha, 426 U.S. 919 (1983), the CRA requires passage by both houses and 
presentment to the President. See Adam M. Finkel & Jason W. Sullivan, A Cost-Ben-
efit Interpretation of the “Substantially Similar” Hurdle In the Congressional Review Act: 
Can OSHA Ever Utter the E-Word (Ergonomics) Again?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 707, 722 n. 
77 (2011) (quoting 142 CONG. REC. 6926, statement of Rep. Hyde) (noting that, “after 
Chada, ‘the one-house or two-house legislative veto . . . was thus voided,’ and as a 
consequence the authors of the CRA developed a procedure that would require pas-
sage by both houses and presentment to the President”). 
 105. The report must include any available cost-benefit analysis. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 801(a)(1) (2018).   
 106. 5 U.S.C. § 801(d) (2018). 
 107. See Michael J. Cole, Interpreting the Congressional Review Act: Why the Courts 
Should Assert Judicial Review, Narrowly Construe “Substantially the Same,” and Decline 
to Defer to Agencies Under Chevron, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 101, 107–110 (2018) [hereinafter 
Cole] (providing overview of CRA and its procedure); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reawaken-
ing the Congressional Review Act, 41 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 197–204 (2018) 
[hereinafter Larkin]. 
 108. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2018). If a rule had taken effect and is later disapproved 
by a joint resolution of disapproval, the rule shall be treated as never having taken 
effect. 5 U.S.C. § 801(f) (2018). 
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is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint 
resolution disapproving the original rule.”109  
Prior to the 2016 election, Congress had successfully enacted only 
one joint resolution of disapproval under the CRA:110  a joint resolution 
disapproving a DOL regulation relating to ergonomics.111 In contrast, 
since President Trump took office, the 115th Republican Congress has 
enacted, and President Trump has signed, fourteen joint resolutions 
“veto[ing] 14 of the 15 [so-called]112 ‘midnight’113 regulations promul-
gated by the Obama Administration,”114  including the 2016 regulatory 
 
 109. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2) (2018).   
 110. Between 1996 and 2011, more than 57,000 agency rules were submitted to 
Congress. Nevertheless, until 2017, Congress only passed seventy-two joint resolu-
tions of approval, and only one became law. See Larkin, supra note 107, at 234.   
 111. Act of March 20, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7 (2001) (vetoing rule 
relating to ergonomics published at 65 Fed. Reg. 68,261). For a detailed discussion 
of this disapproval, see Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 2162, 2169–73 (2009). 
 112. Because of the manner in which the sixty session or legislative days are cal-
culated with rules finalized many months before the election subject to the Congres-
sional Review Act, one may argue that the term “midnight” is a misnomer. Cf. Chris-
topher M. Davis & Richard S. Beth, Agency Final Rules Submitted on after June 13, 2016, 
May be Subject to Disapproval by 115th Congress, CRS INSIGHT (Dec. 15, 2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IN10437.pdf.  
 113. Because the President can always veto disapproval resolutions, the CRA 
mechanism has traditionally been thought to be most relevant during Presidential 
transitions to veto “midnight” regulations. It is particularly useful when the Presi-
dent is of a newly-elected party and accompanied by a newly-gained majority in 
Congress, and together they “seek[] to block rules issued by a prior administration.” 
Cole, supra note 107, at 104.  
  Since the Trump election, however, there has been interest in expanding the 
reach of the CRA to longstanding regulations. Specifically, proponents of an expan-
sion contend that the CRA can be used to invalidate any agency regulations prom-
ulgated since 1996 if a report on the regulation was not properly submitted to Con-
gress. See Larkin, supra note 107, (making and defending this argument); see also 
Cole, supra note 107, at 112, n.46 (noting that “[s]ome prominent attorneys are argu-
ing that the deadline never expired for many rules that were never properly submit-
ted to Congress” and describing this argument and its proponents). To the extent 
that the CRA applies to subregulatory guidance, its potential reach is even more 
significant. Cf. Letter from U.S. General Accountability Office to Senator Patrick 
Toomey (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688763.pdf (opining that 
Bulletin issued by Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection is general statement of 
policy and rule under CRA). 
 114. Cole, supra note 107, at 62,  n.40 (listing the fourteen vetoes); see also Stephan 
Dinan, GOP rolled back 14 of 15 Obama rules using Congressional Review Act, WASH. 
TIMES (May 15, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/ 
15/gop-rolled-back-14-of-15-obama-rules-using-congress/ (discussing varying re-
sponses to use of CRA at outset of Trump Administration).   
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safe harbor.115 It is not entirely clear what Congress’s disapproval of the 
2016 regulatory safe harbor means for state automatic enrollment IRAs. 
Clearly, the 2016 regulatory safe harbor has no effect and states may 
not rely on the 2016 regulatory safe harbor.116 Moreover, it is clear that 
the DOL may not reissue the regulation in substantially the same 
form,117 unless the rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted by 
Congress after May 17, 2017.   
Nevertheless, it is not clear whether state automatic enrollment 
IRAs are preempted by ERISA in the absence of the 2016 regulatory safe 
harbor. A safe harbor guarantees that compliance with the safe harbor 
satisfies the law; it does not, however, foreclose the possibility that ac-
tivities outside the safe harbor also satisfy the law.118 Thus, the 2016 
regulatory safe harbor guaranteed that state automatic enrollment IRAs 
that satisfied the regulatory requirements were not employee benefit 
plans for purposes of ERISA in the view of the Department of the Labor. 
By disapproving the safe harbor, Congress made it clear that states may 
not rely on the 2016 regulatory safe harbor to guarantee that their pro-
grams do not constitute employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA.  
The absence of the 2016 regulatory safe harbor, however, does not 
foreclose the possibility that state automatic enrollment IRAs still do 
not qualify as employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA. For exam-
ple, if the Department of Labor’s reasoning was sound, a court might 
still find that state automatic enrollment IRA programs are not em-
ployee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA despite the removal of the 
 
 115. For a critique of the irony of Republican legislators disapproving the regu-
lation which would devolve power to state governments, see Richard H. Thaler, State 
I.R.A. Plans are Ready, If Congress Doesn’t Interfere, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/upshot/state-ira-plans-are-ready-if-congress-
doesnt-interfere.html.   
 116. The Center for Biological Diversity challenged the constitutionality of the 
CRA in Center for Biological Diversity v. Zinke. The district court dismissed the com-
plaint on May 9, 2018. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 313 F. Supp. 3d 976, 993 
(D. Alaska May 9, 2018).   
 117. What “substantially the same” means is subject to debate. See, e.g., Cole, 
supra note 107, at 132–42 (describing possible interpretations of “substantially the 
same” and arguing that it should be interpreted narrowly); MAEVE P. CAREY ET AL., 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43992 THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT:  FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS, 16–17, 16 n.83 (2016) [hereinafter CAREY ET AL.] (describing “sub-
stantially the same” as inherently ambiguous).   
 118. Susan C. Morse, Safe Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1385, 
1391 (2016) [hereinafter Morse] (stating that “[a] safe harbor guarantees compliance 
for described behavior, without foreclosing the possibility that activities outside the 
safe harbor are also compliant”).   
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regulation from the Code of Federal Regulations.  Recognizing that con-
gressional disapproval of the 2016 regulatory safe harbor does not fore-
close the possibility that state automatic enrollment IRAs do not consti-
tute employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA, the states 
establishing these programs have continued to implement these pro-
grams.119 Commentators and analysts disagree as to whether the auto-
matic enrollment IRAs are preempted by ERISA in the absence of the 
2016 regulatory safe harbor.120 Moreover, two lawsuits have been filed 
claiming that the state automatic enrollment IRA programs are 
preempted by ERISA.121 One of the cases settled shortly after the com-
plaint was filed;122 the other was pending at the time this Article went 
to press.123  
  
 
 119. See Hazel Bradford, States to persist with secure choice, PENSIONS & INS. (May 
15, 2017), http://www.pionline.com/article/20170515/PRINT/305159977/states-
to-persist-with-secure-choice. 
 120. Compare letters from Eversheds Sutherland to U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
(Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/state_ira_let-
ter_final_11-14-17.pdf (arguing that the state automatic enrollment IRA programs 
are preempted by ERISA) [hereinafter Sutherland Letter] with letter from David E. 
Morse, Partner, K&L Gates, to Katie Selenski, Exec. Dir. Cal. Secure Choice (May 16, 
2017), https://www.treasurer.ca.gov/scib/k-l-gates-opinion.pdf (contending that 
IRAs established by California Secure Choice program should not be considered 
“ERISA plans ‘established or maintained’ by covered California employers”) [here-
inafter Morse Letter].   
 121. Complaint, Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. Cal. Secure Choice Ret. Sav. 
Program, No. 2:18-cv-01584 (E.D. Cal. May 30, 2018) [hereinafter HJTA Complaint]; 
Complaint, ERISA Indus. Comm. v. Read, No. 3:17-cv-01605 (D. Or. Apr. 2, 2018), 
[hereinafter ERIC Complaint].  
 122. See Anne Tergesen, Oregon’s Retirement-Savings Plan Settles Legal Challenge 
on Employer Certification:  Settlement provides for some large employers to prove employees 
are covered without filing with state, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2018, 5:50PM), https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/oregons-retirement-savings-plan-settles-legal-challenge-
on-employee-certification-1522263159. The complaint challenging the Oregon pro-
gram and its settlement are discussed in more detail, see infra Section V.A. 
 123. The complaint challenging the California program is discussed in more de-
tail, see infra Section V.B. and postscript.  
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IV. Preemption of State Automatic Enrollment IRA 
Programs in the Absence of the 2016 Regulatory Safe 
Harbor  
As noted above, ERISA preempts (1) state laws that (2) relate to 
(3) employee benefit plans.124 Undoubtedly, the state automatic enroll-
ment IRA programs are established pursuant to state law.125 Thus, 
whether the programs are preempted by ERISA depends on the re-
maining two elements. First, it depends on whether the programs are 
employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA. Second, even if the pro-
grams are not employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA, preemp-
tion also depends on whether the state laws that create the programs 
impermissibly relate to other employee benefit plans in violation of 
ERISA’s express preemption provision. 
A.  Are State Automatic Enrollment IRA Programs Employee 
Benefit Plans for Purposes of ERISA? 
ERISA defines the term “employee benefit plan” in its definition 
section, § 3.126 Section 4 of ERISA then expressly exempts five types of 
plans from ERISA.127 In addition, in the exercise of its regulatory power, 
the DOL has expressly exempted a number of plans, funds, and pro-
grams from the definition of employee benefit plan for purposes of 
ERISA.128  
Because courts typically first consider whether a particular plan 
or arrangement falls within a safe harbor,129 this subsection begins by 
 
 124. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2018).   
 125. ERISA’s preemption provision defines state law to include “all laws, deci-
sions, rules, regulations or other State action having the effect of law, of any State.” 
29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (2018).   
 126. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2018). 
 127. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2018). 
 128. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(b)–(k) (2019) (exempting specific arrangements 
from the definition of “employee welfare benefit plan.”); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(b)–(g) 
(2019) (exempting specific arrangements from the definition of “employee pension 
plan”). These exemptions predate the disapproved exemption for savings arrange-
ments established by states for non-governmental employees and thus are not af-
fected by the disapproval of that exemption. Cf. CAREY ET AL., supra note 117, at 17 
(noting that the disapproval of agency rule amending an existing rule would have 
no effect on existing rule). 
 129. See, e.g., Langley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. 502 F.3d 475, 479 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(“In general, courts apply a three-part test to determine whether ERISA covers a 
particular plan or practice: (1) first, does a ‘safe harbor’ exception apply; (2) if not, 
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discussing whether state automatic enrollment IRAs fall within any of 
the express statutory or regulatory exemptions from ERISA’s definition 
of employee benefit plans. Then, assuming state automatic enrollment 
IRAs do not fall within any of the statutory or regulatory safe harbors, 
this subsection carefully analyzes ERISA’s definition of “employee ben-
efit plan” and considers whether state automatic enrollment IRAs fall 
within the statutory definition of an employee benefit plan in the first 
place. 
1.  EXPRESS STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FROM ERISA’S DEFINITION OF 
“EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN” 
Section 4(b) of ERISA expressly exempts five types of plans from 
ERISA: (1) governmental plans; (2) church plans; (3) plans established 
to comply with workers’ compensation, unemployment compensation, 
or disability insurance laws; (4) plans maintained outside the United 
States primarily for the benefit of nonresident aliens; and (5) funded 
excess benefit plans.130   
State automatic enrollment IRA programs clearly do not fall 
within four of the five types of plans expressly exempted under the 
statute. They are obviously not church plans,131 plans established to 
comply with workers’ compensation, unemployment compensation, or 
disability insurance laws, plans maintained outside the United States 
primarily for the benefit of nonresident aliens,132 or funded excess ben-
efit plans.133  
 
do ‘the surrounding circumstances’ suggest that ‘a reasonable person could ascer-
tain the intended benefits, the class of beneficiaries, the source of financing, and the 
procedures for receiving benefits’; and (3) has ‘the employer established or main-
tained the plan with the intent of providing benefits to its employees’”).  
 130. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2018). 
 131. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(A) (2018) (defining “church plan” as a plan estab-
lished and maintained by a church for its employees). 
 132. Cf. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT 80/5 (2018) (defining “employee” as “any individ-
ual who is 18 years of age or older, who is employed by an employer, and who has 
wages that are allocable to Illinois during a calendar year under the provisions of 
Section 304(a)(2)(B) of the Illinois Income Tax Act”).   
 133. See ERISA § 3(36), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(36) (2018) (defining “excess benefit plan” 
as a plan maintained by an employer solely for the purpose of providing benefits 
for certain employees in excess of the limitations on contributions and benefits im-
posed by [IRC § 415] . . . .”). 
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Superficially, state automatic enrollment IRA programs might ap-
pear to be “governmental plans” because they are enacted by state leg-
islatures.134 Section 3(32) of ERISA, however, defines a “governmental 
plan” as a plan established or maintained by a government for its em-
ployees.135 Because state automatic enrollment IRA programs are estab-
lished to cover private-sector employees,136 rather than state employ-
ees, they are not “governmental plans” expressly exempt from ERISA 
under § 4(b).137 Thus, state automatic enrollment IRA programs do not 
fall within any of the five types of plans expressly exempt from ERISA 
under the statute. 
2.  REGULATORY SAFE HARBORS   
The Department of Labor has long provided regulatory safe har-
bors expressly exempting six types of arrangements from the definition 
of employee pension benefit plan under ERISA: (1) severance pay 
plans, (2) bonus programs, (3) individual retirement accounts, (4) gra-
tuitous payments to pre-ERISA retirees, (5) tax-sheltered annuities, and 
(6) supplemental payment plans.138 
State automatic enrollment IRA programs clearly do not fall 
within five of the six regulatory safe harbors. Specifically, they do not 
qualify as severance pay plans, bonus programs, gratuitous payments 
 
 134. California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§§ 100000–100044 (West 2018); Connecticut Retirement Security Exchange, CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 31–418 (2018); Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 820 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 80/1–95 (2018); Maryland Small Business Retirement Savings Program 
and Trust Act, MD. CODE ANN., LAB & EMPL. §§ 12-201 to -502 (West 2018); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 178.215 (2018).  
 135. ERISA § 3(32), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (2018). 
 136. Cf. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100000 (d)(1) (West 2018) (excluding governmental 
employers from definition of eligible employers subject to the Act); 820 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 80/5 (2018) (defining employers subject to the Act as “a person or entity en-
gaged in a business, industry, profession, trade, or other enterprise in Illinois, 
whether for profit or not for profit” that employs twenty-five or more employees, 
has been in business for at least two years and does not otherwise provide a tax-
favored retirement savings plan to its employees); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT 80/10 (2018) 
(stating that the Program was established “for the purpose of promoting greater re-
tirement savings for private-sector employees in a convenient, low-cost, and porta-
ble manner”).   
 137. See also Derek B. Dorn et al., States Dive Headfirst Into Retirement Coverage 
Debate–But Will Their Initiatives Run Afoul of Federal Law?, 42 PENSION & BENEFIT REP. 
219 (2015) [hereinafter Dorn et al.] (concluding that state automatic enrollment IRA 
programs like the Illinois program would not be “governmental plans” exempt from 
ERISA because they do not cover governmental entity’s employees).   
 138. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2 (2019).   
MOORE.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2019  1:06 PM 
NUMBER 1 ERISA PREEMPTION  71 
to pre-ERISA retirees, tax-sheltered annuities, and supplemental pay-
ment plans. Whether state automatic enrollment IRA programs fall 
within the regulatory safe harbor for individual retirement accounts, 
however, has been a hotly debated question. 
a. Overview of the Regulatory Safe Harbor for IRAs 
The Department of Labor regulations provide that an individual 
retirement account under Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) § 408(a) or 
individual retirement annuity under IRC § 408(b)139 will not constitute 
a “pension plan” for purposes of ERISA if four requirements are satis-
fied: 
(1) No contributions are made by the employer or employee asso-
ciation; 
(2) Participation is completely voluntary for employees or mem-
bers; 
(3) The sole involvement of the employer or employee organization 
is without endorsement to permit the sponsor to publicize the pro-
gram to employees or members, to collect contributions through 
payroll deductions or dues checkoffs and to remit them to the spon-
sor; and 
(4) The employer or employee organization receives no considera-
tion in the form of cash or otherwise, other than reasonable com-
pensation for services actually rendered in connection with payroll 
deductions or dues checkoffs.140 
In 1999, the DOL issued Interpretive Bulletin 99-1 clarifying “the cir-
cumstances under which an employer may facilitate employees’ volun-
 
 139. In an opinion letter, Eversheds Sutherland contends that state automatic 
enrollment IRA programs cannot satisfy the threshold requirement that the pro-
grams be individual retirement accounts or annuities under IRC § 408 because states 
cannot satisfy the criteria for non-bank custodians under IRC § 408(a) and they are 
not licensed insurance companies and thus cannot satisfy the requirements of IRC 
§ 408(b). In addition, Eversheds Sutherland contends that the default contribution 
rates are tantamount to annuities with fixed premium payments and thus fail the 
requirement that IRA annuities not have fixed premiums. Sutherland Letter, supra 
note 120, at 4. David Morse of K & L Gates contends that the custodian argument 
can be easily brushed aside because the state serves as a facilitator and the IRAs will 
be maintained and the assets will be held by separate entities that satisfy the custo-
dial requirements. See David E. Morse, The First State Auto IRA Is Up, Running, and 
Working—So Why Do Some Business Groups Want These Plans to Fail?, 30 BENEFITS L. 
J. 1, 2 (2017).  
 140. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d) (2019). 
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tary contributions to IRAs by providing an IRA payroll deduction pro-
gram without . . . inadvertently establishing or maintaining an em-
ployee pension benefit plan within the scope of [ERISA § 3(2)].”141  
The interpretive bulletin explains that an employer will not be 
viewed as endorsing an IRA so long as the employer maintains neutral-
ity with respect to the IRA sponsor in the employer’s communications 
with its employees.142 The employer may provide its employees with 
information about the program and encourage its employees to save, 
but the employer must make clear to its employees that its involvement 
is limited to collecting the deducted amounts and promptly remitting 
the amounts to the IRA sponsor.143 The employer must make it clear 
that it does not provide any additional benefits or promise any partic-
ular return on any investment.144  
The interpretive bulletin also clarifies that an employer may limit 
the number of IRA sponsors to which employees may make payroll de-
duction contributions so long as any limitations on, or costs or assess-
ments associated with, an employee’s ability to transfer or rollover IRA 
contributions to another IRA sponsor are fully disclosed before the em-
ployee decides to participate in the program.145 In addition, the em-
ployer cannot negotiate to obtain special terms for its employees that 
are not generally available or exercise any influence over the invest-
ments made or permitted by the IRA sponsor.146 
  
 
 141. Interpretive Bulletin 99-1; Payroll Deduction Programs for Individual Re-
tirement Accounts, 64 Fed. Reg. 33,000, 3301 (June 18, 1999) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 
2509.99-1).  
 142. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.99-1(c)(1).  
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.   
 145. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.99-1(d).  
 146. Id.   
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b.  State Automatic Enrollment IRA Programs and the IRA 
Regulatory Safe Harbor for Individual Retirement Accounts 
The state automatic enrollment IRA programs are structured to 
satisfy three of the four requirements set forth in the regulatory safe 
harbor for IRAs. First, the programs prohibit employer contributions.147 
Second, they limit the employers’ involvement to educating employees 
about and enrolling them in the program,148 collecting employees’ con-
tributions through payroll deduction, and remitting contributions to 
 
 147. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-422(f) (2018) (providing that “[n]o employer 
shall be permitted to make a contribution to the program”); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 178.210(1)(h) (2018) (providing that plan must “[r]equire no employer contribu-
tions to employee accounts”); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/65 (2018) (providing for em-
ployee contributions) to be deducted through payroll deductions and not authoriz-
ing employer contributions. Indeed, recognizing that employer contributions are 
not possible under current federal law, the Act’s lead sponsor, Illinois Senator Dan-
iel Bliss, has said that he would like to see future reforms to allow for employer 
contributions to increase the savings rate. Josh Barro, Illinois Will Introduce Automatic 
Retirement Savings, NY TIMES (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/ 
06/upshot/illinois-introduces-automatic-retirement-savings-program-a-first-for-
the-nation.html. The California statute authorizes employer contributions, but pro-
vides that they are only permitted if they would not cause the program to be treated 
as an employee benefit plan under ERISA. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100012(j) (West 2018). 
The current regulations prohibit employer contributions. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, 
chp. 15, §10005(c)(i).  
 148. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100014 (West 2018) (directing Board to design 
and disseminate to employers an employee information packet); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 31-419(a) (2018) (directing Connecticut Board to prepare informational materials 
for distribution by employers to plan participants and prospective plan partici-
pants); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-422 (2018) (directing employers to provide each 
of its covered employees with the informational materials); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
80/55 (2018) (directing participating employers to supply employees with infor-
mation packet about Program); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/60 (2018) (directing em-
ployer to establish payroll deposit retirement savings arrangement and automati-
cally enroll employees who do not opt out of participation).  
MOORE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2019  1:06 PM 
74 The Elder Law Journal VOLUME 27 
the Fund.149 Finally, the programs do not authorize any compensation 
to employers for the cost of participating in the program.150 
 
 149. See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 80/65 (2018) (requiring employers to use 
payroll deposit savings arrangements to collect employee contributions and pay 
them to the Fund). 
  Eversheds Sutherland contends that employer involvement in the auto-
matic enrollment IRA programs exceeds that permitted by the safe harbor because 
the state programs require employers to (1) calculate contribution percentages and 
auto-escalation amounts, (2) determine employee eligibility, (3) verify social secu-
rity numbers and other employee information, and report this information to the 
state, and (4) conduct and provide open enrollment periods. Eversheds Sutherland 
contends that “in States where employers face fines for failing to comply with pro-
gram requirements, employers may be expected to encourage participation in the 
program to avoid penalties, paperwork, etc. associated with an opt-out. It is easy to 
envision a small employer automatically enrolling new employees and thus inad-
vertently establishing an ERISA plan. This level of involvement is clearly beyond 
the scope contemplated by the safe harbor.” Sutherland Letter, supra note 120, at 5.   
  Contrary to Eversheds Sutherland’s contention, it is not clear that employ-
ers’ involvement in the state automatic enrollment IRA programs exceed the level 
of involvement contemplated by the safe harbor. The four activities described by 
Sutherland are ministerial tasks. They do not involve employer discretion and do 
not raise concerns about an employer endorsing a particular service provider, a fo-
cus of the safe harbor requirement. Cf. Interpretive Bulletin 99-1; Payroll Deduction 
Programs for Individual Retirement Accounts, 64 Fed. Reg. 33,000, 33,002 (June 18, 
1999) (stating that “so long as an employer maintains neutrality with respect to an 
IRA sponsor in its communications with its employees, the employer will not be 
considered to ‘endorse’ an IRA payroll deduction program”). See also Golden Gate 
Restaurant Ass’n v. City and County of S.F., 546 F.3d 639, 650 (9th Cir. 2008) (reject-
ing claim that employer pay-or-play mandate created plan when it required em-
ployers to keep track of employees’ hours and employer credits and noting that 
“[m]any federal, state and local laws, such as income tax withholding, social secu-
rity, and minimum wage laws, impose similar administrative obligations on em-
ployers; yet none of these similar obligations constitutes an ERISA plan”). 
  In addition, as K&L Gates noted in its opinion letter, in two Advisory Opin-
ions the Department of Labor has permitted some level of employer involvement 
without the IRA payroll deduction program falling outside the safe harbor. Morse 
Letter, supra note 120, at 4–5 (citing and discussing DOL Advisory Opinion Letter 
2001-03A (Feb. 15, 2001) (permitting employer, as contract holder of a payroll de-
duction IRA program that was invested in a group annuity contract, to vote on the 
annuity provider’s upcoming plan of demutualization and elect the method for al-
locating the demutualization proceeds among the IRA participants) and DOL Ad-
visory Opinion 82-27A (June 16, 1982) (permitting employer to select three IRA 
sponsors from pool of applicants, periodically review each sponsor’s performance, 
replace underperforming sponsors, and negotiate for and receive written indemni-
fication from each sponsor).  
 150. Cf. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 80/30(m) (2018) (directing Board to make provi-
sion for the payment of administrative costs and expenses for the creation, manage-
ment, and operation of the program and cross-referencing eight different types of 
administrative costs and expenses, none of which include reimbursement of em-
ployer’s expenses for participating in program).   
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Whether state automatic enrollment IRA programs satisfy the 
fourth requirement that employee participation be “completely volun-
tary”151 is subject to considerable debate. Neither the regulatory safe 
harbor for IRAs nor Interpretive Bulletin 99-1 expressly address the 
question whether a state automatic enrollment IRA with an opt-out fea-
ture satisfies the requirement that employee participation be “com-
pletely voluntary.” Nor is there any other binding authority answering 
that question.152  
i.  Arguments on Whether State Automatic Enrollment IRAs are 
Completely Voluntary Prior to the 2016 Regulatory Safe Harbor 
Prior to the Department of Labor’s issuance of the now-disap-
proved 2016 regulatory safe harbor, Cardozo Law Professor Edward 
Zelinsky and Executive Director and Chief Executive Officer of the 
American Society of Pension Professionals and Actuaries Brian Graff 
argued that a state law that requires automatic enrollment with an opt-
out feature should be considered “completely voluntary” for purposes 
of the regulatory safe harbor for IRAs.153 In contrast, Derek Dorn, Mi-
chael Hadley, and Courtney Zinter of Davis & Harman argued in a Pen-
sion & Benefits Reporter article that “it is generally thought that the in-
clusion of an automatic enrollment feature results in employer 
involvement in excess of that allowed under the [IRA] safe harbor.”154 
According to Professor Zelinsky, “[a] straightforward reading of 
the relevant DOL regulation indicates that employees’ participation in 
 
 151. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(ii) (2018).   
 152. Cf. Conn. Ret. Security Bd., Testimony of Brian H. Graff on behalf of the Ameri-
can Society of Pension Professionals and Actuaries, ST. OF CONN. COMPTROLLER, (Feb.  
4, 2015) https://www/osc.ct.gov/crsb/docs/02_04_15/Brian%20Graff%20Testi-
mony.pdf (stating that “ASPPA, [National Association of Plan Advisors and Na-
tional Tax-Deferred Savings Association] are not aware of legal guidance that di-
rectly addresses whether a payroll deduction IRA that includes an automatic 
enrollment with opt out design will trigger employee benefit plan status under 
ERISA”) [hereinafter Graff Testimony].  
 153. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Retirement in the Land of Lincoln: The Illinois Secure 
Choice Savings Program Act, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 181 (2016) [hereinafter Zelinsky]; 
Graff Testimony, supra note 152. 
 154. Dorn et al., supra note 137; see also Eric G. Serron, Preemption Questions for 
Ill. Payroll Deduction IRA Plan, LAW 360 (Jan. 22, 2015, 4:16 PM), https://www.step-
toe.com/en/news-publications/preemption-questions-for-ill-payroll-deduction-
ira-plan.html (identifying ERISA preemption questions and suggesting that ques-
tions likely to be resolved in favor of finding Illinois program preempted).   
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the Illinois [automatic enrollment IRA program] is ‘completely volun-
tary’ since employees may readily and without penalty leave the Illi-
nois plan or may modify their respective contribution levels.”155 Profes-
sor Zelinsky cited field assistance guidance issued by the DOL with 
respect to health savings accounts (“HSA”) in support of his argu-
ment.156  
In Field Assistance Bulletin 2006-02, the Department of Labor de-
clared that an employer may open an HSA for an employee and deposit 
funds into the health savings account without violating the require-
ment that the establishment of a health savings account by an employee 
be “completely voluntary.”157 According to the DOL, “[t]he intended 
purpose of the ‘completely voluntary’ condition . . . is to ensure that 
any contributions an employee makes to an HSA, including salary re-
duction amounts, will be voluntary.”158 The DOL explained that:  
HSA accountholders have sole control and are exclusively respon-
sible for expending HSA funds and generally may move the funds 
to another HSA or otherwise withdraw the funds.  The fact that an 
employer unilaterally opens an HSA for an employee and deposits 
employer funds into the HSA does not divest the HSA ac-
countholder of this control and responsibility and, therefore, 
would not give rise to an ERISA-covered plan so long as the condi-
tions described in FAB 2004-01 [which are parallel to the require-
ments imposed on individual retirement accounts] are met.159 
Brian Graff testified before the Connecticut Retirement Security 
Board that the better view is that a payroll deduction IRA that includes 
 
 155. Zelinsky, supra note 153, at 181. 
 156. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULL. NO. 2006–02, HEALTH 
SAVINGS ACCOUNTS-ERISA Q&A-1 (2006). Professor Zelinsky recognizes that a Field 
Assistance Bulletin is not entitled to strong deference but contends that “it is a rea-
sonable interpretation of the Department’s own regulation and of the concept of 
voluntariness in the context of employer-sponsored accounts.” Zelinsky, supra note 
153, at 182. 
 157. The Labor regulations provide a safe harbor for certain welfare benefit 
plans.  29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1 (2018). Among other arrangements, they provide a safe 
harbor for “certain group or group-type insurance programs” that meet four re-
quirements, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j)(1)–(4) (2018), that are parallel to the four require-
ments for individual retirement accounts set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d) (2018). 
In Field Assistance Bulletin 2004-1, the Department of Labor announced that health 
savings accounts that meet the four conditions set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j) 
(2018) will not be treated as employee welfare benefit plans for purposes of ERISA. 
In Field Assistance Bulletin 2006-02, the Department of Labor responded to recur-
ring questions it had received regarding HSAs since its issuance of Field Assistance 
Bulletin 2004-01.   
 158. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULL. NO. 2006–02, HEALTH 
SAVINGS ACCOUNTS ERISA Q&A-1 (2006).  
 159. Id.   
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automatic enrollment with an opt out feature “can be structured to 
avoid ERISA coverage so long as the automatic enrollment with opt out 
feature at a specified rate is mandated by law or regulation and is not 
an employer option.”160 According to Graff, as long as employees have 
a reasonable opportunity to opt out of participation, enrollment should 
be considered voluntary because employees still control whether or not 
they participate.161 To the extent that automatic enrollment may appear 
to encourage or force employee participation the state, rather than the 
employee, is responsible.162 In Graff’s opinion, the distinction between 
states mandating automatic enrollment and employers electing auto-
matic enrollment is important because the purpose of the regulation is 
to address whether an employer is establishing or maintaining a plan.163  
Graff contended that an employer should not be viewed “as en-
gaging in activities to establish or maintain a plan where the employer 
is merely complying with a legal mandate . . . and does not have or ex-
ercise any discretion with respect to employee participation.”164 In sup-
port of his position, Graff cited DOL Field Assistance guidance165 which 
makes it clear that employers can satisfy the compliance obligations im-
posed on IRC § 403(b) tax-deferred annuities166 without triggering 
ERISA plan status, which requires, among other things, that employee 
participation be completely voluntary167 “so long as plan documents 
still describe a limited employer role and allocate all discretionary de-
terminations to the investment provider or employee participant and 
 
 160. Graff Testimony, supra note 152, at 4. 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id.   
 163. Id. at 4–5. Cf. Coverage; Reporting and Disclosure Requirements, 40 Fed. 
Reg. 34,526, 43,528 (Aug. 15, 1975) (stating that “Section 2510.3-2(d) makes it clear 
that individual retirement accounts . . . are not pension plans under section 3(2) of 
the Act because they are not established or maintained by an employer or an employee or-
ganization”) (emphasis added).   
 164. Graff Testimony, supra note 152, at 5. 
 165. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULL. NO. 2007-02, ERISA 
COVERAGE OF IRC SECTION 403(B) TAX-SHELTERED ANNUITY PROGRAMS (2007). 
 166. 26 C.F.R. § 1.403(b)-0 to -11 (2018). 
 167. The Labor regulations provide a safe harbor for IRC § 403(b) tax sheltered 
annuities so long as four requirements, that are similar, though not identical, to the 
requirements for individual retirement accounts, are satisfied. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(f) 
(2018). Most significantly, both safe harbors require that employee participation be 
completely voluntary. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(1)(ii) (2018); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-
2(f)(1) (2018).   
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the employer does not negotiate terms of products offered by invest-
ment providers.”168 
As noted above, Derek Dorn and his colleagues contended that “it 
is generally thought that the inclusion of an automatic enrollment fea-
ture results in employer involvement in excess of that allowed under 
the safe harbor.”169 In support of this assertion, Derek Dorn et al. cited, 
among other things, a 2011 ERISA Advisory Council Report in which 
the Council noted that it had decided not to recommend that the DOL 
include an automatic enrollment feature in the IRC § 403(b) safe harbor 
regulation.170 The Council explained:  
[A] majority of Council members concluded that automatic enroll-
ment would require actions typically performed by a plan spon-
sor/fiduciary (e.g., designation of a default investment alterna-
tive), and consequently, an automatic enrollment option in the plan 
may not be viewed as voluntary even in light of the participant’s 
right to opt out of the automatic contributions.171 
Dorn et al. also noted that proposed federal automatic IRA legislation 
included a specific exemption from ERISA172 “because, otherwise, an 
automatic enrollment payroll deduction IRA, even one required by 
[federal] law, would be treated as an ERISA plan.”173 In addition, Dorn 
et al. pointed to a letter issued by the Department of Labor to the federal 
government174 regarding the federal “myRA” program established by 
 
 168. Graff Testimony, supra note 152, at 5. 
 169. Dorn et al., supra note 137.   
 170. Id. 
 171. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE & PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, 
CURRENT CHALLENGES AND BEST PRACTICES FOR ERISA COMPLIANCE OF 403(B) 
PLAN SPONSORS 17 (2011) [hereinafter ERISA COMPLIANCE REPORT]. 
 172. Specifically, Dorn and his colleagues cite Automatic IRA Act of 2011, S. 
1557, 112 Cong. (2011). Section 2(f) of the bill amends ERISA § 3(2) of ERISA to in-
clude a new subsection (C) exempting an automatic IRA arrangement described in 
IRC § 438(C): “if, under the arrangement, contributions are to be made to a desig-
nated automatic IRA the provider of which is included on the website list estab-
lished under section 440(b) of [the IRC], are to be made to an individual retirement 
plan pursuant to section 440(c), or are to be made to the Secretary of the Treasury 
for investment in retirement bonds pursuant to section 440(d).” Dorn et al., supra 
note 137. For more recent proposed federal automatic IRA bills with specific ERISA 
exemptions, see, e.g., Automatic IRA Act of 2015, S. 245, 114th Cong. § 2(d) (2015); 
Automatic IRA Act of 2013, 113th Cong.§ 2(d) (2013).   
 173. Dorn et al., supra note 137.   
 174. Letter from John J. Canary, Dir. of Regulations and Interpretations, U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor, to J. Mark Iwry, Senior Advisor to the Sec’y and Deputy Assistant 
Sec’y for Ret. And Health Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury (Dec. 15, 2014) [hereinafter 
Canary Letter].   
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President Obama175  (which is no longer in effect)176 in support of their 
argument. 
ii.  Department of Labor’s View as to Whether State Automatic Enrollment 
IRAs are Completely Voluntary as Set Forth in Preamble to Now-Disapproved 
2016 Regulatory Safe Harbor  
In the preamble to the Department of Labor’s proposed 2016 reg-
ulatory safe harbor, the DOL expressly addressed the question whether 
state automatic enrollment IRAs qualify as “completely voluntary” for 
purposes of the safe harbor for IRAs.177 Specifically, the DOL an-
nounced that the DOL intended the term “completely voluntary” to 
mean “considerably more than that employees are free to opt out of 
participation in the program. Instead, the employee’s enrollment must 
be self-initiated.”178  The preamble explained that the completely volun-
tary condition is:  
important because where the employer is acting on his or her own 
volition to provide the benefit program, the employer’s actions—
e.g., requiring an automatic enrollment arrangement—would con-
stitute its ‘establishment’ of a plan within the meaning of ERISA’s 
text, and trigger ERISA’s protections for the employee whose 
money is deposited into an IRA.179 
The DOL noted that courts have held in other contexts that opt-
out arrangements are not consistent with a “completely voluntary” re-
quirement.180 In a footnote in support of this proposition, DOL cited 
 
 175. myRA: A Simple, Safe, Affordable Retirement Savings Account, U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Documents/FINAL%20my 
RA%20Fact%20sheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) [hereinafter myRA]. 
 176. See Press Release, Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Announces Steps to Wind 
Down MyRA Program (July 28, 2017), https://www/treasury.gov/press-cen-
ter/press-releases/Pages/sm0135.aspx.   
 177. Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Em-
ployees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,006, 72,008 (proposed Nov. 18, 2015). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id.  
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three reported decisions,181 three unreported decisions,182 field assis-
tance bulletins regarding HSAs,183 and the Advisory Council’s report 
on 403(b) plans.184 As the Department recognized, however, none of the 
authorities is directly on point; none involved a state-mandated opt-out 
arrangement.185 Thus, none of the cited authorities unequivocally es-
tablishes that a state-mandated opt-out arrangement cannot be “com-
pletely voluntary” for purposes of regulatory safe harbor for IRAs.   
In the preamble to the final, now-disapproved, 2016 regulatory 
safe harbor, the DOL rejected claims by commentators that the DOL 
 
 181. See Schear v. Food Scope Am., Inc., 297 F.R.D. 114, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (cit-
ing NY Department of Labor Opinion which provides that in order “[f]or a volun-
tary ‘tip pooling’ arrangement to exist, it must be ‘undertaken by employees on a 
completely voluntary basis and may not be mandated or initiated by employers’ 
and an employer can take ‘no part in the organization or the conduct of [the] tip-
pool” and finding that “Defendants’ documents indicate that they had a heavy hand 
in facilitating the tip sharing arrangement”); Doe v. Wood County Bd. of Ed., 888 F. 
Supp. 2d 771, 773, 776 (S.D. W. Va. 2012) (holding that option to opt out of single-
sex education program does not satisfy Department of Education regulation that 
single-sex programs be “completely voluntary;” noting that discussion leading up 
to regulations state that recipient is strongly encouraged to “receive authorization 
from parents or guardians to enroll their children in a single-sex class”); see also The 
Meadows v. Empl’rs Health Ins., 826 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Ariz. 1993) (finding that par-
ticipation in group health insurance plan was not completely voluntary when em-
ployer agreed in contract to 100 percent participation of all employees for life and 
accidental and death and dismemberment insurance and 75 percent participation of 
all eligible employees for medical coverage).   
 182. Carter v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 2011 WL 1884625 *1 (E.D. Ky. May 18, 2011) 
(noting that courts have held Department of Labor regulatory safe harbor for certain 
group or group-type insurance programs’ requirement that participation be “com-
pletely voluntary” (29 C.F.R. 2510-3.1(j)) not satisfied if enrollment in plan is auto-
matic and holding that participation in this case was automatic and thus did not 
satisfy completely voluntary requirement); Thompson v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 2005 
WL 722717 *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2005) (finding plan participant’s participation in 
group health plan was not completely voluntary because participation was auto-
matic rather than voluntary); Davis v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 1987 WL 16837 *2 
(D.D.C. Aug. 31, 1987) (participation in group health plan not completely voluntary 
where employer paid premiums for employees and employee would not receive 
alternative form of compensation if employee chose to withdraw from plan).   
 183. The Department of Labor cited Field Assistance Bulletins 2004-1 and 2006-
2, which Professor Zelinsky cited in support of his argument that state automatic 
enrollment IRA programs fall within the IRA regulatory safe harbor. See supra notes 
156–57 and accompanying text. 
 184. Derek Dorn and his colleagues also cited this report in support of their ar-
gument that state mandated automatic enrollment IRAs do not fall within the regu-
latory safe harbor for IRAs.  See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text. 
 185. Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Em-
ployees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,006, 72,008 (proposed Nov. 18, 2015). 
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was arbitrary in interpreting the safe harbor for IRAs to prohibit auto-
matic enrollment.186 The DOL asserted that its interpretation was “a 
reasonable reading of the safe harbor condition supported by legal au-
thorities interpreting the concept of ‘completely voluntary’ in other 
contexts.”187 The DOL further claimed that its position was “consistent 
with a legitimate policy concern about employers implementing ‘opt-
out’ provisions in employer-endorsed IRA arrangements without hav-
ing to comply with ERISA duties and consumer protection provi-
sions,”188 and asserted that the concern is not present with state auto-
matic enrollment IRA programs. 
The DOL’s interpretation of the term “completely voluntary” in 
the preamble to the disapproved regulation is not binding.189 Neverthe-
less, it merits consideration to the extent the reasoning is persuasive. 
Congressional disapproval of the regulation has no effect on the under-
lying authorities cited in the preamble. 
iii.  Should State Automatic Enrollment IRA Programs be Considered 
“Completely Voluntary” for Purposes of the IRA Regulatory Safe Harbor?  
As previously discussed, there is no definitive answer to the ques-
tion whether state automatic enrollment IRA programs are completely 
voluntary for purposes of the IRA regulatory safe harbor. This subsec-
tion considers whether state automatic enrollment IRA programs 
 
 186. Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Em-
ployees, 81 Fed. Reg., 59,464, 59,471 (Aug. 30, 2016). 
 187. Id.   
 188. Id.   
 189. Even if the regulation had not been disapproved, the preamble would not 
have been binding. According to Professor Kevin Stack, however, it should have 
been granted special judicial deference. Kevin M. Stack, Preambles as Guidance, 84 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1252 (2016). Professor Stack has written that, “[w]hile all agree 
that regulations are primary sources of law, strikingly little attention has been de-
voted to the method of their interpretation.” Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 356–57 (2012). He presents a strong argument that regulations 
should be interpreted based on the purpose defined by the agency, relying on how 
notice and comment rulemaking defines the content of law. See generally id. The Su-
preme Court has at least on one occasion suggested that, when interpreting a regu-
lation, the agency’s intent is properly considered. See Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 
415, 430 (1988). For a discussion of the general rules governing deference to agency 
interpretations, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E Baer, The Contin-
uum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from 
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008) (providing a discussion of the general 
rules governing deference to agency interpretations); see also Kent Barnett, Codifying 
Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2015); Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chev-
ron Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2018). 
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should be considered completely voluntary. This subsection first ap-
plies a plain meaning approach; then it applies a purposive approach. 
Finally, it considers the persuasiveness of the authorities that commen-
tators and the Department of Labor have cited in support of their posi-
tions.  
According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, voluntary means 
“proceeding from the will or from one’s own choice or consent . . . un-
constrained by interference . . . acting or done of one’s own free will 
without valuable consideration or legal obligation.”190 It appears clear 
that employees’ participation in state automatic enrollment IRA pro-
grams is voluntary because employees are not required to participate in 
state automatic enrollment IRA programs, and employees may readily 
and without penalty opt out of participation.191  
On the other hand, state automatic enrollment IRA programs do 
not appear to be completely voluntary. According to the Merriam-Web-
ster dictionary, completely means “total or absolute.”192 Because state 
automatic enrollment IRA programs are designed to take advantage of 
employees’ natural inertia and affirmatively require employees to opt 
out if they do not wish to participate, participation does not appear to 
be completely voluntary within the plain meaning of those words. Thus, 
under a plain meaning approach, it appears that state automatic enroll-
ment IRAs are not completely voluntary for purposes of the IRA regu-
latory safe harbor.   
Determining whether state automatic enrollment IRA programs 
fall within the regulatory safe harbor for IRAs should not be based 
solely on the dictionary’s definition of the words “completely volun-
tary.” Instead, it is important to consider the purpose of the IRA regu-
latory safe harbor. As Brian Graff noted, the purpose of the IRA safe 
 
 190. Voluntary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/voluntary (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).   
 191. Cf.  Zelinsky, supra note 153, at 181 (stating that “[a] straightforward read-
ing of the relevant DOL regulation indicates that employees’ participation in the 
Illinois plan is ‘completely voluntary’ since employees may readily and without 
penalty leave the Illinois plan or may modify their respective contribution levels); 
Graff Testimony, supra note 152, at 4 (arguing that as long as employees have a rea-
sonable opportunity to opt out of participation, enrollment should be considered 
voluntary because employees still control whether or not they participate). 
 192. Completely, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, available at https://www. 
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/completely (last visited Apr. 1, 2019). 
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harbor is to determine whether an employer is establishing or maintain-
ing a plan.193 Indeed, the preamble to the IRA safe harbor states that 
“[s]ection 2510.3-2(d) makes it clear that individual retirement ac-
counts . . . are not pension plans under section 3(2) of the Act because 
they are not established or maintained by an employer or an employee organi-
zation.”194 
In the preamble to the proposed 2016 regulatory safe harbor, the 
DOL reiterated this view explaining that the completely voluntary con-
dition is:  
[I]mportant because where the employer is acting on his or her own 
volition to provide the benefit program, the employer’s actions—
e.g., requiring an automatic enrollment arrangement—would con-
stitute its ‘establishment’ of a plan within the meaning of ERISA’s 
text, and trigger ERISA’s protections for the employee whose 
money is deposited into an IRA.195  
To the extent that state automatic enrollment IRA programs mandate 
that employers automatically enroll employees in the state programs, a 
strong argument may be made that the plans fall within the intent of 
the regulation. When the programs are mandated by the state, employ-
ers are not “engaging in activities to establish or maintain a plan;” they 
are simply complying with a state mandate.196 The state, rather than the 
employer, is establishing or maintaining the plan. Thus, a purposive 
approach suggests that state-mandated automatic enrollment IRA pro-
grams should be viewed as falling within the IRA safe harbor.   
Both commentators and the DOL cited the 2011 ERISA Advisory 
Council’s decision not to recommend that the DOL include an auto-
matic enrollment feature in the IRC § 403(b) safe harbor regulations in 
support of their view that state automatic enrollment IRAs are not com-
pletely voluntary for purposes of the IRA safe harbor. Superficially, the 
Advisory Council’s decision supports the view that automatic enroll-
ment programs should not fall within the safe harbor because the Ad-
visory Council did not recommend that an automatic enrollment fea-
ture be included within the IRC § 403(b) safe harbor. A closer look at 
 
 193. Graff Testimony, supra note 152, at 4–5.   
 194. Coverage; Reporting and Disclosure Requirements, 40 Fed. Reg. 34,526, 
43,528 (Aug. 15, 1975) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510, 2520) (emphasis added). 
 195. Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Em-
ployees, 80 Fed. Reg., 72,006, 72,008 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 
2510). 
 196. Cf. Graff Testimony, supra note 152, at 5.   
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the reasoning, however, makes it less persuasive in the context of state-
mandated programs.  
According to the Advisory Council Report, the Council was con-
cerned voluntary employer-initiated plans would require the employer 
to perform “actions typically performed by a plan sponsor/fiduciary 
(e.g., designation of a default investment alternative).”197 Unlike volun-
tary plans, state-mandated plans do not require employers to perform 
actions typically performed by plan sponsors/employers. Instead, 
those functions are performed by the state. Thus, the Advisory Coun-
cil’s reasoning supports the argument that state automatic enrollment 
IRA programs are established by the state, not employers, and thus 
may fall within the IRA regulatory safe harbor. 
Professor Zelinsky cited Field Assistance Bulletin (FAB) 2006-02 
in support of his argument that state automatic enrollment IRAs may 
qualify as voluntary.198 In contrast, in the preamble to the proposed 
2016 regulatory safe harbor the DOL asserted that neither FAB 2006-02, 
nor its predecessor, FAB 2004-01, suggest “that employee contributions 
to an HSA could be completely voluntary under an opt out arrange-
ment.”199 The two field assistance bulletins address the question of 
when an HSA may fall within the regulatory safe harbor for employee 
welfare benefit plans which includes a requirement that the plans be 
“completely voluntary.”   
The field assistance bulletins establish that an employer may con-
tribute to a HSA without violating the completely voluntary require-
ment.200 The HSAs at issue, however, were not opt-out programs, and 
the field assistance bulletins do not address the question whether an 
opt-out program can be viewed as “completely voluntary.” Thus, as the 
DOL recognized, the field assistance bulletins do not support the argu-
ment that opt-out arrangements can qualify as completely voluntary. 
Nor do they support an argument that opt-out arrangements cannot 
qualify as completely voluntary. They are simply agnostic on the issue. 
The six decisions cited by the DOL in its preamble to the proposed 
regulation are no more helpful on the issue. The three reported deci-
 
 197. ERISA COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 171, at 17. 
 198. Zelinsky, supra note 153, at 181.  
 199. Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Em-
ployees, 80 Fed. Reg., at 72,008.   
 200. Id.  
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sions do not involve employee benefit plans and thus are easily distin-
guishable. The three unreported decisions do involve employee bene-
fits plans, but like the field assistance bulletins, do not involve state-
mandated opt-out arrangements. Thus, they are no more persuasive 
than the field assistance bulletins. Moreover, the opinions are not re-
ported and thus are not binding.  
Dorn et al. point to the fact that proposed federal bills introducing 
automatic enrollment payroll deduction IRAs have included a statutory 
exemption from ERISA’s definition of a pension plan in support of their 
position that opt-out arrangements are employee benefit plans for pur-
poses of ERISA.201 To illustrate, the proposed Automatic Enrollment 
IRA Act of 2015202 included a provision amending ERISA’s definition 
of employee pension benefit plan to provide: 
(C) An automatic IRA arrangement described in section 408B(d) of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall not be treated as an employee 
pension benefit plan or pension plan if, under the arrangement, contri-
butions are to be made to an automatic IRA the provider of which 
is included in the website list established under section 408B(h)(3) 
of such Code, are to be made to an individual retirement plan des-
ignated by the employee, or are to be invested in retirement bonds 
(whether to the Secretary of the Treasury or to a designated trustee 
or other agent for that purpose).203 
Dorn et al. assert that this proposed provision shows that without this 
exemption, “an automatic enrollment IRA, even one required by [fed-
eral law], would be treated as an ERISA plan.”204   
Undoubtedly, this claim, based on the rule against surplusage,205 
has superficial appeal. It is, however, not entirely convincing. Simply 
because the bills included a provision clarifying that a federal auto-
matic enrollment IRA program is not preempted by ERISA does not 
mean that a federal automatic enrollment IRA program would be 
 
 201. Dorn et al., supra note 137.  
 202. H.R. 2035, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 203. H.R. 2035, 113th Cong. § 2(d) (2013) (adding new § (C) to ERISA § 3(2)’s 
definition of employee pension benefit plan) (emphasis added). 
 204. Dorn et al., supra note 137. 
 205. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 677 
(5th ed. 2014) (“Under the whole act rule, the presumption is that every word and 
phrase adds something to the statutory command. Accordingly, it is a cardinal rule 
of statutory interpretation that no provision should be construed to be entirely re-
dundant.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). For cases in which the Su-
preme Court has applied this rule against superfluity, see Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. 
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); ICC v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co., 288 U.S. 14, 
25–26 (1933).  
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preempted in the absence of such a provision. The drafters may have 
simply included the provision because they recognized there would be 
some uncertainty as to whether the federal automatic enrollment IRA 
program would be preempted in the absence of such a provision. No 
negative inference should be drawn when Congress includes a provi-
sion that seeks to clarify an otherwise ambiguous situation.206  
As their final cited authority, Dorn et al. referred to a letter issued 
by the DOL to the federal government regarding the federal myRA pro-
gram established by the Obama Administration in support of their ar-
gument that state automatic enrollment IRA programs are not “com-
pletely voluntary” for purposes of the IRA safe harbor regulation.207 In 
contrast, Professor Zelinsky contends that reading the letter in such 
manner “stretches [it] inordinately.”208 
Unveiled by President Obama in his 2014 State of the Union ad-
dress,209 the myRA program, like the state automatic enrollment IRA 
programs, created Roth IRAs to assist individuals without access to an 
employer-sponsored retirement plan to save for retirement.210 Like the 
state automatic enrollment IRA programs, employees could contribute 
directly to the myRA program by payroll deductions through their em-
ployer.211 Unlike the state programs, the myRA program did not pro-
vide for automatic enrollment.212 
The DOL letter did not focus on the IRA safe harbor and its re-
quirements in determining whether the myRA program was exempt 
from ERISA. Indeed, the letter only referred to the regulation once, in a 
footnote, where it found that the myRA program did not fail the IRA 
 
 206. See Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 140 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(rejecting an argument based on the rule against superfluity); see also Fort Stewart 
Sch. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641, 646 (1990) (describing “two [statu-
tory] exceptions [that] are indeed technically unnecessary, and were inserted out of 
an abundance of caution—a drafting imprecision venerable enough to have left its 
mark on legal Latin (ex abundanti cautela)”); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, 
Delegation and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 934 (2013) (noting that “draft-
ers intentionally err on the side of redundancy to ‘capture the universe’ or ‘because 
you just want to be sure you get it’”).   
 207. Canary Letter, supra note 174.  
 208. Zelinsky, supra note 153, at 182. 
 209. Kristen Ricaurte Knebel, Obama Administration Fleshes Out Plan For ‘Starter’ 
Retirement Account for Workers, 41 Pension & Benefits Rep. 238, 242 (2014).   
 210. myRA, supra note 175.   
 211. Id.  
 212. Id.  
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safe harbor requirement that the employer not “endorse” an IRA.213 In-
stead, citing Massachusetts v. Morash,214 the DOL focused on Congress’s 
intent in determining whether the program should be subject to 
ERISA.215 
The Department of Labor letter concluded: 
 Thus, given the character of the program, including its voluntary 
nature, its establishment, sponsorship, and administration by the 
federal government, and the absence of any employer funding or 
role in its administration or design, the Department is of the view 
that an employer would not be establishing or maintaining an “em-
ployee pension benefit plan” within the meaning of section 3(2) of 
ERISA based solely on the facts that employees participate through 
payroll withholding contributions and that the employer distrib-
utes information, facilitates employee enrollment, and otherwise 
encourages employees to make deposits to myRA accounts owned 
and controlled by employees.216 
As Professor Zelinsky contends, reading the letter to provide that 
state automatic enrollment IRAs are employee benefit plans for pur-
poses of ERISA stretches it inordinately. Indeed, if anything, the letter 
could be read to support a conclusion that state automatic enrollment 
 
 213. Specifically, the third of the four regulatory requirements is that the sole 
involvement of the employer is “without endorsement” to permit the sponsor to 
publicize the program to an employee, to contributions through payroll deductions 
and to remit them to the sponsor. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(3) (2018). The Canary letter 
declares: 
Allowing employers to recommend a specific IRA or provider, but then 
to claim no responsibility to prudently select the IRA or monitor the 
provider would undercut the protections offered by ERISA. The above 
concerns do not arise where the employer, without representing that 
the myRA is an employee benefit plan sponsored by the employer, is 
encouraging employees to take advantage of services or benefits of-
fered by the federal government. 
Canary Letter, supra note 174, at 2 n.2. 
 214. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S 107 (1989). 
 215. Specifically, the letter states: 
Although the myRA program is designed to provide retirement in-
come to individuals, including employees, we do not believe that Con-
gress intended in enacting ERISA that a federal government retirement 
savings program created and operated by the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury would be subject to the extensive reporting, disclosure, fidu-
ciary duty, or other requirements of ERISA, which were established to 
ensure against the possibility that employees’ expectations of a prom-
ised benefit would be defeated through poor management by the plan 
sponsor and other plan fiduciaries. 
Canary letter, supra note 174, at 2. 
 216. Id.  
MOORE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2019  1:06 PM 
88 The Elder Law Journal VOLUME 27 
IRA programs are not employee benefit plans because the state auto-
matic enrollment IRA programs, like the federal myRA program, are 
established, sponsored, and administered by the government, and the 
employer does not fund the IRAs and plays no role in the administra-
tion or design of the program.   
In conclusion, no authority is directly on point, and thus no au-
thority unequivocally establishes whether or not state-mandated auto-
matic enrollment IRAs fall within the IRA safe harbor. Based on the in-
tent of the regulatory safe harbor for IRAs, a strong argument can be 
made that state automatic enrollment IRAs are “completely voluntary” 
for purposes of the safe harbor. Such an interpretation, however, would 
be inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words, completely volun-
tary. Moreover, it would require that the words “completely volun-
tary” be given a totally different meaning when applied to voluntary 
employer-initiated plans than to state-mandated plans. Thus, a strong 
argument can be made that state mandated automatic enrollment IRAs 
should not be considered “completely voluntary” for purposes of the 
IRA safe harbor.   
3.   ERISA’S DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN 
Yet, even if state-mandated automatic enrollment IRAs do not fall 
within the IRA safe harbor, that does not mean that they must be 
viewed as employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA.217 Instead, 
state-mandated automatic enrollment IRAs are only employee benefit 
plans if they fall within the meaning of employee benefit plans under 
ERISA’s definition of employee benefit plans.   
Section 3(3) of ERISA defines an “employee benefit plan” as “an 
employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or 
a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee 
 
 217. As the Morse letter notes, “[a] regulatory safe harbor is just that:  it provides 
a bright-line standard for identifying programs that are not covered by ERISA, but 
does not cover the landscape for what is or is not an ERISA plan. Morse Letter, supra 
note 120, at 6; see also Gross v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 734 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 
2013) (stating that “[a] benefits program that fails the safe harbor test will not nec-
essarily be deemed an ERISA plan . . . Exemption also may result from application 
of the ‘conventional tests’ for determining whether ERISA governs”); Morse, supra 
note 118, at 81 (stating that “[a] safe harbor guarantees compliance for described 
behavior, without foreclosing the possibility that activities outside the safe harbor 
are also compliant”). 
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pension benefit plan.”218 Section 3(2)(A), in turn, defines an “employee 
pension benefit plan” in relevant part as:  
Any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter estab-
lished or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by 
both, to the extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding 
circumstances such plan, fund, or program – 
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or 
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extend-
ing to the termination of covered employment or beyond, regard-
less of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, 
the method of calculating benefits under the plan or the method of 
distributing benefits from the plan.219 
Thus, whether state automatic enrollment IRA programs are em-
ployee benefit plans220 for purposes of ERISA depends on whether they 
are “established or maintained by an employer or by an employee or-
ganization.”221  
ERISA does not define the term “established or maintained.”222 It 
does, however, define the term “employer.” Specifically, ERISA § 3(5) 
defines employer as “any person acting directly as an employer or indi-
rectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to any employee benefit 
plan.”223 In an opinion letter, Eversheds Sutherland points to this defi-
nition and suggests that state automatic enrollment IRA programs are 
established or maintained by employers because the states establish or 
 
 218. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2018). 
 219. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2018) (emphasis added).   
 220. In the leading case of Donovan v. Dillingham, the 11th Circuit set forth a four 
prong test for determining whether there is a “plan” for purposes of ERISA. Do-
novan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1982). Under this four prong test, 
there must be (1) intended benefits, (2) intended beneficiaries, (3) a source of financ-
ing, and (4) a procedure to apply for and collect benefits. Id. The state automatic 
enrollment IRA programs appear to satisfy this test. The harder question, discussed 
in the text, is whether any such plan is established or maintained by an employer or 
an employee organization. 
 221. In its complaint, the HJTA alleges that the California program is an em-
ployee benefit plan under ERISA. HTJA Complaint, supra note 120, at ¶ 22. The com-
plaint, however, does not explain how the program is “established or maintained 
by an employer or by an employee organization.” It simply alleges that it is “a pen-
sion benefit plan or both a pension benefit plan and a welfare benefit plan” and thus 
an “‘employee benefit plan’ under ERISA.” Id.; See infra. Section V.B. (discussing this 
issue in text).   
 222. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., Opinion Letter 2012-
02A (May 25, 2012) (stating that “[t]he phrase ‘establish or maintain’ is not defined 
in ERISA.”).   
 223. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (2018) (emphasis added).   
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maintain them “in the interest of an employer.” 224 Howard Jarvis Tax-
payers Association (“HJTA”) makes a similar argument in a lawsuit 
challenging the California program.225  
It is not, however, entirely clear that state automatic enrollment 
IRA programs are established in the interest of employers. Rather, a 
strong argument can be made that they are established in the interest 
of employees. First, given the relatively low barrier to establishing cer-
tain types of retirement plans, an employer would have already volun-
tarily established a retirement plan if it were in the employer’s interest 
to do so. As HJTA points out, the state laws mandate employer partici-
pation;226 the mandate only applies to employers that have elected not 
to voluntarily establish a plan. More significantly, the statutory lan-
guage of the state statutes establishing the state automatic enrollment 
IRAs indicate that the laws are intended to benefit employees who do 
not have access to employer-provided pensions, rather than to benefit 
employers who choose not to establish plans. For example, California’s 
law provides that “the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings 
Trust [is] to be administered by the board for the purpose of promoting 
greater retirement savings for California private employees in a conven-
ient, voluntary, low-cost, and portable manner.”227 Similarly, Illinois’ 
law states that the Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program “is hereby 
established and shall be administered by the Board for the purpose of 
promoting greater retirement savings for private-sector employees in a 
convenient, low-cost, and portable manner.”228 
Moreover, the language in the statutes establishing the programs, 
indicates that the programs are established by the state law, or by an 
entity created by the state law, rather than the employer. For example, 
Connecticut’s law provides that “[t]he Connecticut Retirement Security 
Authority shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of an 
individual retirement account for each program participant.”229 Simi-
larly, Maryland’s law provides that the Maryland Small Business Re-
tirement Savings Board “shall cause the Program or payroll deposit 
 
 224. Sutherland Letter, supra note 120, at 3. 
 225. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss ¶ 8, Howard Jarvis 
Taxpayers Ass’n v. Cal. Secure Choice Ret. Savings Program, No. 2:18-cv-01584 
(Aug. 30, 2018) [hereinafter HJTA Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss].   
 226. Id.  
 227. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 10004(a) (West 2018). 
 228. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/10 (2018) (emphasis added).   
 229. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-420(a) (2018). 
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IRA arrangements established under the Program to be designed, es-
tablished, and operated.”230  
While relevant, statutory language creating the state automatic 
enrollment IRA programs is not determinative. Courts consider the 
purpose of the established or maintained requirement as well as the 
purposes of ERISA and its preemption provision in determining 
whether a specific arrangement is established or maintained by an em-
ployer.231  
According to the frequently cited232 Tenth Circuit decision Peck-
ham v. Gem State Mutual of Utah,233 “[t]he ‘established or maintained’ 
requirement appears designed to ensure that the plan is part of an em-
ployment relationship.”234 Courts look “at the degree of participation 
by the employer in the establishment or maintenance of the plan” in 
determining whether the plan is part of an employment relationship.235 
In the case of state automatic enrollment IRA programs, there is a 
strong argument that state automatic enrollment IRAs are not part of 
an employment relationship because the employer plays no more than 
a ministerial role in the administration of the plans.   
In Golden Gate Restaurant Association v. City and County of San Fran-
cisco,236  the Ninth Circuit held that a San Francisco health care pay-or-
play mandate was not preempted by ERISA.237 The ordinance required 
covered employers to spend a specified amount of “health care expend-
itures to or on behalf of” certain employees.238 Covered employers were 
permitted to satisfy the requirement by spending a defined amount on 
health care for their employees through their own ERISA-covered plans 
 
 230. MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 12-204(a)(1) (West 2018).   
 231. Cf. Belanger v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 71 F.3d 451, 455 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting 
that “[t]here is no authoritative checklist that can be consulted” to determine 
whether an employer’s actions establish an ERISA plan). 
 232. As of June 2018, Peckham had been cited in 130 opinions. For recent citations 
to Peckham for the proposition that the established or maintained requirement “ap-
pears to be designed to ensure that the plan is part of an employment relationship,” 
see, e.g., Saunders v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1952580, at *1 (D. 
Colo. Mar. 1, 2018); Charles Schwab & Co. v. Debickero, 593 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 233. Peckham v. Gem State Mut., 964 F.2d 1043 (10th Cir. 1992).   
 234. Id. at 1049.   
 235. Id. 
 236. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 237. Id. at 661. 
 238. Id. at 643 (quoting S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 14.3(a)).  
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or by paying a required amount to the city.239 Payments made to the 
city did not go into a general fund; instead, they were to be used either 
to fund membership in the city’s Health Access Program for uninsured 
San Francisco residents or to establish and maintain medical reimburse-
ment accounts for covered employees.240 
In an amicus brief filed with the Ninth Circuit, the DOL argued 
that the Health Access Program (“HAP”) was an employee benefit plan 
under ERISA.241 The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument and found 
that the city of San Francisco, rather than the employer, established and 
maintained the HAP.242 Among the reasons identified for finding the 
city, rather than the employer, established the HAP was the fact that 
“neither the employer nor the covered employee ha[d] any control over 
the kind and level of benefits provided by the HAP.”243 
The DOL announced that it had reconsidered its position in an 
amicus brief it filed in opposition to a petition for certiorari in Golden 
Gate.244 In the brief, the DOL announced that it was planning to “issue 
a proposed regulation ‘clarify[ing] the circumstances under which 
health care arrangements established or maintained by state or local 
 
 239. Id. at 644–45.   
 240. Id.  
 241. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. 
City of San Francisco, 546 F. 3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-1515). 
 242. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d at 653–54.  
 243. Id. at 654. The court offered three other reasons in support of its finding that 
the HAP was established by the city rather than the employer. First, funding for the 
HAP comes primarily from taxpayers. Golden Gate Rest Ass’n, 546 F. 3d. at 653. 
Second, “[t]he HAP exists, and will continue to exist, whether or not any covered 
employer makes a payment to the City under the Ordinance.” Id. Third, employers 
have no control over the eligibility of their employees; eligibility depends on income 
level, age, uninsured status, and City residence, and the City is free to change the 
eligibility criteria. Id. at 653–54. The first two reasons are clearly inapplicable to state 
automatic enrollment IRAs. Arguably, the third reason applies because the states 
have the power to change the eligibility criteria at any time. On the other hand, the 
third reason does not unequivocally apply to state automatic enrollment IRAs be-
cause employers have total control over the eligibility of their employees. If the em-
ployer elects to offer an employer-sponsored plan, its employees are not eligible for 
the state automatic enrollment IRA program. If the employer elects not to offer an 
employer-sponsored pension plan, its employees are generally eligible to partici-
pate in a state-mandated automatic enrollment IRA program. Thus, although Golden 
Gate offers support for the proposition that state automatic enrollment IRAs should 
not be considered employee benefit plans, the case can be distinguished from state 
automatic enrollment IRA programs. 
 244. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Opposing Writ of Certiorari at 12, 
Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008) (no. 
08-1515). 
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governments for the benefit of non-governmental employees do not 
constitute an employee welfare benefit plan’ under ERISA.”245 Ulti-
mately, in light of the enactment of the Affordable Care Act, the De-
partment of Labor never issued the proposed regulation.246 The fact that 
the DOL never issued the proposed regulation does not detract from 
the fact that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Golden Gate as well as the 
DOL’s position on reconsideration support the view that state auto-
matic enrollment IRA programs are established or maintained by the 
state, rather than the employer, because the employer has no control 
over the terms of a state automatic enrollment IRA.247 
In Massachusetts v. Morash,248 the Supreme Court announced that 
Congress’ primary concern in enacting ERISA “was with the misman-
agement of funds accumulated to finance employee benefits and the 
failure to pay employee benefits from accumulated funds.”249 There is 
little risk of employer mismanagement of accumulated funds in state 
automatic enrollment IRA programs because employers play no role in 
the management of the funds. Instead, the programs are managed and 
administered by entities created by the state to manage and administer 
the programs.250 Of course, there is a risk of mismanagement by the en-
tities charged with managing and administering the programs.251 In or-
 
 245. Id. (quoting Health Care Arrangements Established by State and Local Gov-
ernments for Non-Governmental Employees, 74 Fed. Reg. 64,275, 64,276 (Dec. 7, 
2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1) (2016).   
 246. Because the ACA imposed individual, IRC § 5000A, and large employer 
IRC § 4980H mandates, it substantially reduced the likelihood that state and local 
governments would enact additional health care mandates and thus made the pro-
posed regulation less pressing. For a discussion of the large employer pay-or-play 
mandate, see Kathryn L. Moore, The Future of Employment-Based Health Insurance after 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 89 NEB. L. REV. 885, 903-906 (2011).  
 247. As discussed in footnote 243 supra, this support is not unequivocal because 
the Ninth Circuit relied on four factors in finding that the HAP was not an employee 
benefit plan, and only one of the four factors is clearly applicable to state automatic 
enrollment IRA programs. See Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F. 3d at 647–54.  
 248. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107.   
 249. Id. at 112. 
 250. See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., WORKER REACTIONS TO STATE SPONSORED 
AUTO-IRA PROGRAMS 1 (2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2017 
/10/retirement_savings_worker_reactions_v5.pdf (“Under these plans, workers 
without access to a workplace retirement plan would see regular deductions from 
their paychecks sent to an IRA managed by a private financial services firm.”). 
 251. One of the justifications offered by the sponsors of the resolutions disap-
proving the 2016 regulatory safe harbor and a similar safe harbor for local govern-
ment plans was that the regulations would “ultimately force workers into govern-
ment-run IRAs without the consumer protections provided by ERISA.” INDIVIDUAL 
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der to address that risk, all of the state automatic enrollment IRA pro-
grams include express fiduciary provisions that parallel ERISA’s fidu-
ciary provisions.252 
There is some limited risk that employers will not forward em-
ployee contributions to the state IRA programs.253 There is a similar risk 
that employers may not forward employees’ Social Security contribu-
tions to the federal government, or that employers may not forward 
employees’ contributions to traditional payroll deduction IRAs to the 
financial institution offering the IRAs and neither Social Security254 nor 
traditional payroll deduction IRAs255 are employee benefit plans for 
purposes of ERISA. Thus, to the extent that Congress’ primary concern 
in ERISA is to protect against employers’ mismanaging the funds of 
employee benefit plans, state automatic enrollment IRAs need not be 
considered employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA.   
Congress’ second principal purpose in enacting ERISA was to 
protect employers from “the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State 
and local regulation of employee benefit plans.”256 Whether the state 
automatic enrollment IRA programs give rise to the threat of incon-
sistent state and local regulation depends on what effect, if any, they 
 
RETIREMENT PLANS GUIDE LETTER NO. 424, supra note 97, at 4. For a discussion of 
how effective the 2016 regulatory safe harbor was in protecting against misfeasance 
and malfeasance at the plan level, see Moore, supra note 21, at 76–79.   
 252. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100002(d) (West 2018); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 80/25 
(2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-421 (2018); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 12-203(a) 
(West 2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 178.205(2)(c) (2018). The state programs differ from 
private programs governed by ERISA in a couple of significant ways, but it appears 
that the state programs provide a reasonable level of protection against mismanage-
ment by the entities charged with administering the programs. See Moore, supra note 
21, at 79.   
 253. Cf. George v. Junior Achievement of Cen. Ind., 694 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(concerning employer, who facing financial difficulties, fails to deposit money with-
held from employee’s paychecks into employee’s 401(k) account).  
 254. Since Social Security is established by the federal government and not by 
individual private employers, Social Security is not an employment benefit plan for 
purposes of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (defining employee benefit plan as 
plan established by employer or employee organization).  
 255. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d) (2019). 
 256. Saunders v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 16-w-1474-JLK, 2018 
WL 1952580 at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 1, 2018) (In passing ERISA, Congress’ purpose was 
twofold: to protect employees and to protect employers. Congress wanted to safe-
guard employee interests by reducing the threat of abuse or mismanagement of 
funds that had been accumulated to finance employee benefits, while at the same 
time safeguarding employer interests by eliminating the threat of conflicting and 
inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans.); Demars v. 
CIGNA Corp., 173 F.3d 443, 446 (1st Cir. 1999) (identifying same two purposes). 
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have on employer-sponsored pension plans. That issue is addressed in 
the following subsection which considers whether state automatic en-
rollment IRA programs impermissibly relate to other employee benefit 
plans.   
In sum, looking at the plain language of ERISA’s definition of em-
ployee benefit plan, the plain language of the state automatic enroll-
ment IRA statutes, as well as ERISA’s purpose of protecting against em-
ployer mismanagement of funds, a strong argument can be made that 
state automatic enrollment IRA programs should not be viewed as em-
ployee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA. 
B.  Even If State Automatic Enrollment IRAs are Not Employee 
Benefit Plans for Purposes of ERISA, Do They Nevertheless 
Impermissibly Relate to Other Employee Benefit Plans? 
Even if the state automatic enrollment IRA programs are not em-
ployee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA, the state laws establishing 
the programs are preempted by ERISA if they impermissibly “relate to” 
other employee benefit plans. Under the Supreme Court’s two-prong 
test, a state law relates to an employee benefit plan if it has (1) a refer-
ence to or (2) a connection with an employee benefit plan.257 
This subsection begins by discussing whether state automatic en-
rollment IRA programs have an impermissible reference to employee 
benefit plans. It then considers whether they have an impermissible 
connection with employee benefit plans. 
1.  STATE AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT IRA PROGRAMS AND THE 
REFERENCE TO PRONG 
The Supreme Court explained in Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insur-
ance Company258 that a state law has a “reference to” an employee bene-
fit plan if the state law “acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA 
plans . . . or . . . the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s 
operation.”259 If the state automatic enrollment IRA programs are found 
to be employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA, then it seems clear 
 
 257. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995).   
 258. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016).   
 259. Id. at 943 (quoting Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., 
N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 825, 325 (1997)). 
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that the laws establishing the programs have an impermissible refer-
ence to the programs because the existence of the state automatic en-
rollment IRA program is essential to the law’s operation. Indeed, it is 
the very purpose of the law.   
On the other hand, if the state automatic enrollment IRA pro-
grams are found not to be employee benefit plans for purposes of 
ERISA, then the state laws creating the programs will not violate the 
“reference to” prong of the test if they do not operate immediately and 
exclusively upon ERISA plans. In Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & 
Service, Inc.,260  the Supreme Court held that a state statute that expressly 
exempted ERISA welfare plans from a generally applicable state gar-
nishment statute violated the “reference to” prong because the statute 
expressly referred to and solely applied to ERISA employee benefit 
plans.261 In contrast, in California Div. of Labor Standards v. Dillingham 
Construction, the Court held that a California law that permitted con-
tractors to pay a lower wage to workers participating in state-approved 
apprenticeship programs did not violate the “reference to” prong.262 
The Court recognized that many or even most of the apprenticeship 
programs were covered by ERISA.263 Nevertheless, it held that the law 
did not contain a prohibited reference to ERISA plans because it func-
tioned in the same manner regardless of whether a particular appren-
ticeship program was covered by ERISA.264 
Accordingly, whether the state laws’ exemption provisions vio-
late the reference to prong depend on whether they apply exclusively 
to ERISA plans. Although none of the state statutes use the term 
“ERISA-covered plans” or similar terminology expressly referring to 
plans covered by ERISA, all of the state statutes’ exemption provisions 
clearly exempt employers that offer ERISA-covered plans.265 Whether 
 
 260. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988). 
 261. Id. at 830 (holding that “GA. CODE ANN. 18-4-22.1 (2018), which singles out 
ERISA employee welfare benefit plans for different treatment under state garnish-
ment procedures is preempted under section 514(a). The state statute’s express ref-
erence to ERISA plans suffices to bring it within the federal law’s preemptive 
reach.”).   
 262. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards v. Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 
319 (1997). 
 263. Id. at 327 n.5.  
 264. Id. at 332–33.   
 265. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(g)(1) (West 2018); 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 80/5 
(2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-422(a)(4)(A) (2018); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. 
§ 12-101(d)(2)(v) (West 2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 178.210(1)(b) (2018). For example, the 
California, Illinois, and Oregon statutes expressly exempt employers that offer 
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state laws also exempt employers that offer retirement savings arrange-
ments that are not covered by ERISA is less clear.   
As discussed above, traditional payroll deduction IRAs are clearly 
exempt from ERISA under the regulatory safe harbor for IRAs. Thus, if 
the state laws exempt employers that offer traditional payroll deduc-
tion IRAs from coverage, then the state laws’ exemption provisions do 
not violate the reference to prong. None of the state laws expressly ex-
empt employers that offer traditional payroll IRAs. All of the state laws, 
however, can be arguably interpreted to exempt either employers that 
offer traditional payroll IRAs, or other arrangements that are exempt 
from ERISA, or both.   
Two of the state laws can easily be interpreted to exclude employ-
ers that offer traditional payroll IRAs. First, Maryland’s statute exempts 
“an employer that currently offers an employer-offered savings ar-
rangement that was established separately from the requirements of 
this title.”266 Undoubtedly, a traditional payroll deduction IRA can be 
considered “an employer-offered savings arrangement” established 
separately from the requirement of the Maryland mandate, and Mary-
land law directs the Maryland Board “to take any action necessary to 
ensure that the Program is not preempted by federal law.”267 Second, 
Connecticut’s statute exempts “[a] qualified employer that (i) maintains 
a retirement plan or retirement arrangement described under Section 
219(g)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any other corre-
sponding internal revenue code of the United States as amended from 
time to time, or (ii) any other retirement arrangement approved by the au-
thority.”268 This statutory language clearly grants power to the Connect-
icut Retirement Security Authority to exempt employers that offer tra-
ditional payroll deduction IRAs.   
 
401(k) plans, and 401(k) plans are subject to ERISA’s regulation. Cf. Tibble v. Edison 
Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823 (2015) (applying ERISA’s fiduciary statute of limitations to 
401(k) plan). Although the Connecticut and Maryland statutes do not expressly 
identify the types of employer-sponsored retirement plans that exempt an employer 
from the statute, most employer-sponsored retirement plans are governed by 
ERISA. See William A. Schmidt, ERISA Overview for Investment Advisers, SJ058 ALI-
ABA 27 (2004) (stating that “ERISA covers most privately sponsored employee pen-
sion benefit plans, including jointly trusteed Taft-Hartley plan, individual employer 
sponsored plans, and plans established or maintained by tax-exempt entities”). 
 266. MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 12-101(d)(2)(v) (West 2018). 
 267. MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 12-204(c) (2018).   
 268. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-422(4)(A) (2018) (emphasis added).   
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The Illinois and Oregon laws can also be interpreted to exclude 
employers that offer traditional payroll IRAs. Specifically, the Illinois 
statute exempts employers that have “offered a qualified retirement 
plan including, but not limited to, a plan qualified under section 401(a), 
401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 408(k), 408(p), or 457(b) of the Internal Revenue 
Code.”269 The Oregon statute contains similar “including, but not lim-
ited to” language.270 Because these two statutes provide that “qualified 
plans” include, but are not limited to, the plans listed in the statute, it 
is not unreasonable to interpret the statutes to extend exemptions to 
employers that offer traditional payroll deduction IRAs that are exempt 
from ERISA under the safe harbor for IRAs. Moreover, the DOL regu-
lations exempt from ERISA “tax sheltered annuities,” that is, IRC 
§ 403(b) annuities that meet certain requirements.271 The Illinois and 
Oregon statutes’ reference to IRC 403(b) could reasonably be inter-
preted to exempt employers that offer 403(b) plans that are exempt 
from ERISA under the regulatory safe harbor for tax sheltered annui-
ties. Similarly, the broad exemption language found in the Maryland 
and Connecticut statutes could also be interpreted to exempt employers 
that offer 403(b) annuities that satisfy the regulatory safe harbor for tax-
sheltered annuities. 
It would be more difficult to interpret the California statute to ex-
empt employers that offer traditional payroll deduction IRAs. The Cal-
ifornia statute expressly exempts employers that offer “automatic enroll-
ment payroll deduction IRAs.”272 The maxim “expression unius est 
exclusion alterius”273 suggests that California’s statute should be inter-
preted to exclude employers that offer automatic enrollment, but not 
traditional, payroll deduction IRAs. As discussed above,274 there is a 
serious question as to whether the regulatory safe harbor for IRAs ap-
 
 269. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 80/5 (2018).   
 270. See OR. REV. STAT. § 178.210(1)(b) (2018) (“[U]nless the employer offers a 
qualified retirement plan, including but not limited to a plan qualified under section 
401(a), section 401(k), section 403(a), section 403(b), section 408(k), section 408(p), or 
section 457 of the Internal Revenue Code”) (emphasis added).   
 271. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(f) (2018).   
 272. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(g)(1) (West 2018) (“[a]n employer that . . . of-
fers an automatic enrollment payroll deduction IRA, shall be exempt from the require-
ments of the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Program.”) (emphasis 
added).   
 273. See, e.g., NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 940 (2017) (discussing 
canon).   
 274. See supra, Section III(A)(2)(b)(iii) & III(A)(3).   
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plies to automatic enrollment IRAs voluntarily initiated by an em-
ployer. The California statute could, however, reasonably be inter-
preted to exempt employers that offer IRC § 403(b) annuities that qual-
ify for the safe harbor for tax-sheltered annuities because the statute 
uses non-exclusive language to enumerate the types of plans employers 
may offer to qualify for the exemption. Specifically, the California stat-
ute exempts “[a]n employer that provides an employer-sponsored re-
tirement plan, such as a defined benefit plan or a 401(k), Simplified Em-
ployee Pension (SEP) Plan, or Savings Incentive Match Plan for 
Employees (SIMPLE) plan . . . if the plan . . . qualifies for favorable in-
come tax treatment under the federal Internal Revenue Code.”275 This 
“such as” language can reasonably encompass section 403(b) annuities 
that qualify for the regulatory safe harbor for tax-sheltered annuities.   
In sum, a strong argument can be made that none of state auto-
matic enrollment IRA programs violate the first “reference to” prong of 
the relates to element of ERISA preemption. Each of the state statutes 
can reasonably be interpreted to exempt employers that offer plans that 
are not regulated by ERISA. Specifically, most of the state statutes can 
reasonably be interpreted to exclude employers that offer traditional 
payroll deduction IRAs that are exempt from ERISA under the regula-
tory safe harbor for IRAs. In addition, all of the statutes can be inter-
preted to exempt employers that offer 403(b) annuities that are exempt 
from ERISA under the regulatory safe harbor for tax-sheltered annui-
ties. Thus, a strong argument can be made that none of the state stat-
utes’ exemption provisions act exclusively upon ERISA-covered plans 
and thus none of the statutes are preempted under the reference to 
prong. 
C.  State Automatic Enrollment IRA Programs and the Connection 
With Prong 
In New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Insurance Co. (“Travelers”),276 the Supreme Court announced 
that it must look “to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the 
 
 275. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(g)(1) (West 2018) (emphasis added). The Cali-
fornia regulations confirm that employers that offer traditional payroll deduction 
IRAs are not exempt but employers that offer 405(b) annuities are exempt. CAL. 
CODE REGS. tit. 10, chp. 15, §1000(x).   
 276. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1997).   
MOORE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2019  1:06 PM 
100 The Elder Law Journal VOLUME 27 
scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive” in ap-
plying the “connection with” prong.277 The Court declared that “[t]he 
basic thrust of the pre-emption clause, then, was to avoid a multiplicity 
of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration 
of employee benefit plans.”278 
If the state laws establishing state automatic enrollment IRA pro-
grams were to require employers’ pension plans to meet certain mini-
mum requirements before the employer was exempt from the auto-
matic enrollment IRA programs, then the state laws would likely have 
a connection with employee benefit plans. This is because the minimum 
requirements could impermissibly interfere with nationally uniform 
plan administration. For example, if the statutes in two states were to 
require that plans satisfy different specific default investment options, 
an employer could not have a single uniform pension plan. Instead, an 
employer would have to have a plan with one type of default invest-
ment option in one state and a different type of default investment op-
tion in the other state.   
At present, however, none of the five states with automatic enroll-
ment IRA programs imposes minimum requirements on pension plans 
before the employer is exempt from the state law. Instead, all of the 
state laws simply provide that if the employer offers its employees a 
pension plan, then the employer is exempt from the state mandate. 
Thus, as currently structured, none of the state automatic enrollment 
IRA programs appear to give rise to the risk of conflicting inconsistent 
state and local regulation of employee benefit plans because none of the 
programs directly or indirectly regulate employer-sponsored pension 
plans. The exemptions apply regardless of the terms of any employer-
sponsored plans. 
The state laws may encourage employers to adopt employee ben-
efit plans in order to avoid the state mandate, and thus may have an 
indirect influence on employee benefit plans.  Such an indirect influ-
ence, however, should not fall within the scope of the connection with 
prong under the Court’s reasoning in Travelers. 
Travelers involved a preemption challenge to a New York statute 
that required hospitals to collect surcharges from patients covered by 
commercial insurers but not from patients insured by Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield, and subjected certain Health Maintenance Organizations 
 
 277. Id. at 656. 
 278. Id. at 657.  
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(“HMO”) to surcharges that varied with the number of Medicaid pa-
tients that the HMOs enrolled.279 The Court distinguished the sur-
charge law from state laws that mandate employee benefit structures 
or their administration.280 The Court recognized the surcharges would 
make Blue Cross/Blue Shield more attractive to ERISA plans.281 The 
Court, however, described their effect as “an indirect economic influ-
ence” that “does not bind plan administrators to any particular choice 
and thus function as a regulation of an ERISA plan itself.”282 According 
to the Court, “the indirect influence of the surcharges [does not] pre-
clude uniform administrative practice or the provision of a uniform in-
terstate benefit package if a plan wishes to provide one. It simply bears 
on the cost of benefits and the relative costs of competing insurance to 
provide them.”283  
The Court concluded, “cost uniformity was almost certainly not 
an object of preemption, just as laws with only an indirect economic 
effect on the relative costs of various health insurance packages in a 
given State are a far cry from those ‘conflicting directives’ from which 
Congress meant to insulate ERISA plans.”284 Therefore, according to the 
Court, the surcharges did not have an impermissible “connection with” 
employee benefit plans and were not preempted by ERISA.285 Similarly, 
because the state automatic enrollment IRA legislation simply encour-
ages employers to establish employee benefit plans but does not impact 
the terms of the plans, a strong argument can be made that, like the 
surcharges in Travelers, the state automatic enrollment IRA legislation 
has only an indirect influence on employee benefit plans and thus does 
not have an impermissible connection with employee benefit plans. 
  
 
 279. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 514 U.S. at 649.   
 280. Id. at 657–58. 
 281. Id. at 659. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 660. 
 284. Id. at 662. 
 285. Id.  
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V.  Complaints Challenging State Automatic 
Enrollment IRAs 
At the time this Article went to press, two complaints had been 
filed challenging state automatic enrollment IRA programs. The first 
complaint challenged the Oregon law’s reporting requirement. The sec-
ond, broader, complaint contends that the entire California program is 
preempted by ERISA.286 This subsection briefly analyzes the merits of 
each of these complaints. 
A.  Complaint Challenging Oregon Reporting Requirement 
In October 2017, the ERISA Industry Committee (“ERIC”) filed 
the first lawsuit challenging a state automatic enrollment IRA program 
on preemption grounds.287 In its suit, ERIC did not challenge the state 
automatic enrollment IRA program as a whole. Instead, the complaint 
alleged that the Oregon law’s reporting requirement was preempted by 
ERISA.288 The Oregon statute requires the Oregon Retirement Savings 
Board (“Oregon Board”) to establish a process for employers to obtain 
an exemption if the employer offers a qualified retirement plan.289 Pur-
suant to this statutory mandate, the Oregon Board promulgated a rule 
providing that:  
An authorized representative of an Employer may file a Certificate 
of Exemption with the Program by certifying, through the Program 
Administrator’s internet portal or other means of data transmittal 
specified and validated by the Program Administrator, that the 
Employer offers a Qualified Plan to some or all of its Employees.290 
The regulation further provided that:  
A Certificate of Exemption is valid for three (3) years from the date 
the Employer files the Certificate with the Program Administrator, 
so long as the Employer continues to offer a Qualified Plan to some 
or all of its Employees. A Certificate may be renewed by following 
a process of recertification to be established by the Board not later 
than December 31, 2019.291 
 
 286. The Illinois Program is expected to face a legal challenge when it is imple-
mented. See Michael J. Bologna, Illinois Secure Choice Retirement Program Could Face 
Legal Challenge, BLOOMBERG L. (July 20, 2018), https://www.bna.com/illinois-se-
cure-choice-n73014477728/. 
 287. See ERIC Complaint, supra note 121. 
 288. See id. at ¶ 1.   
 289. OR. REV. STAT. § 178.215(8) (2018).   
 290. OR. ADMIN. R. 170-080-0020(1) (2018). 
 291. Id. at 170-080-0020(2). 
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In its complaint, ERIC alleged that the state statute and regulation 
have a “‘connection with’ ERISA plans because they impose reporting 
requirements on multi-state plan sponsors operating in Oregon by re-
quiring the filing of a certificate of exemption to avoid the obligation to 
register to administer the Oregon Retirement Savings Plan.”292 The 
complaint further alleged that the reporting requirement interferes 
with nationally uniform ERISA plan administration by requiring plan 
sponsors to report to the Oregon Board on the sponsors’ ERISA activity 
of providing ERISA-governed retirement benefits.”293  
In Gobeille, the Supreme Court reiterated that in considering 
whether a state statute has an impermissible “connection with” an 
ERISA plan, the Court will consider “the objectives of the ERISA statute 
as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would 
survive”294 in addition to “the nature of the effect of the state law on 
ERISA plans.”295 Gobeille involved a challenge to a Vermont law requir-
ing “health insurers, health care providers, health care facilities, and 
governmental agencies to report any ‘information relating to health 
care costs, prices, quality, utilization, or resources required’ by the state 
agency, including data relating to health insurance claims and enroll-
ment.”296 The implementing regulation required “the submission of 
‘medical claims data, member eligibility data, provider data, and other 
information,’ . . . in accordance with specific formatting, coding, and 
other requirements.”297 
The Court announced that “reporting, disclosure, and record-
keeping are central to, and an essential part of, the uniform system of 
plan administration contemplated by ERISA.”298 It found that “Ver-
mont’s reporting regime, which compels plans to report detailed infor-
mation about claims and plan members, both intrudes upon ‘a central 
matter of plan administration’ and ‘interferes with nationally uniform 
 
 292. ERIC Complaint, supra note 121, at ¶ 19.   
 293. Id. at ¶ 20.   
 294. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016) (quoting Travel-
ers). 
 295. Id. at 943 (quoting Dillingham). 
 296. Id. at 941. 
 297. Id. (citation to regulation omitted).   
 298. Id. at 945. 
MOORE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2019  1:06 PM 
104 The Elder Law Journal VOLUME 27 
plan administration.’”299 The Court held that pre-emption was “neces-
sary to prevent the States from imposing novel, inconsistent, and bur-
densome reporting requirements on plans.”300 
ERIC’s complaint clearly had some merit. Oregon’s law required 
employers to file a Certificate of Exemption in order to be exempt from 
the law, and the Court in Gobeille announced that “reporting, disclo-
sure, and recordkeeping are central to, and an essential part of, the uni-
form system of plan administration contemplated by ERISA.”301 Be-
cause Oregon’s law imposed a reporting requirement, and other states 
may also impose similar, though not identical, reporting requirements, 
the Oregon reporting requirement arguably fell within the Gobeille pro-
hibition.   
On the other hand, Oregon’s reporting requirement was much 
less burdensome than the reporting requirements in Gobeille. The Ver-
mont law required reporting on member eligibility, medical claims, and 
pharmacy claims.302 Depending on the number of individuals an entity 
served, covered entities could be required to submit data on an annual, 
quarterly, or even monthly basis.303 In contrast, under Oregon’s law, an 
employer was only required to file a single Certificate of Exemption 
once every three years.304 It is at least arguable that preemption of the 
Oregon requirement was not “necessary to prevent the States from im-
posing novel, inconsistent, and burdensome reporting requirements on 
plans.”305  
Recognizing that there was at least some merit in ERIC’s claim, 
the Oregon Board reached a settlement with ERIC in March 2018. Ac-
cording to a joint negotiated statement, ERIC dismissed its lawsuit, and  
[u]nder the terms of the settlement, ERIC members may inform the 
State, if it asks that they are ERIC members, and the State will verify 
their membership with ERIC to confirm their exemption from Or-
egonSaves. In the meantime, ERIC will continue to work with the 
appropriate federal regulatory agencies to seek changes to existing 
 
 299. Id. (quoting Egelhoff).   
 300. Id. at 945.   
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at 941. 
 303. Id. 
 304. OR. ADMIN. R. 170-180-020(2) (2018).  
 305. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 945 (2016). 
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reporting forms required under ERISA that can provide Oregon 
and other states the information they desire.306 
In October 2018, the Oregon state treasurer announced it would 
rely on Form 5500 data to automatically exempt employers that already 
have a retirement plan in place.307 Form 5500 is an annual report, with 
information about the plan’s financial conditions, investments, and op-
erations, that virtually all employer-sponsored retirement plans must 
file electronically each year to satisfy federal reporting requirements 
under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code.308 In late 2018, the Ore-
gon state treasurer sent a notice to employers who had filed a Form 
5500 linked to their employer identification number that they were ex-
empt and did not need to take any action.309 Only employers with re-
tirement plans that did not receive an automatic exemption notice were 
required to complete the online exemption process.310 
B.  Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association Complaint 
On May 31, 2018, the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association 
(“HJTA”) filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of California challenging the California Secure Choice Retire-
ment Savings Program.311 Unlike the ERIC complaint, which only chal-
lenged Oregon’s reporting provision, HJTA’s complaint alleges that the 
entire California program is preempted and seeks a declaration that the 
program is void.312  
 
 306. Order Dismissing Without Prejudice, Incorporating Settlement, and Retain-
ing Jurisdiction at Exhibit A ¶9. ERISA Indus. Comm. v. Read, No. 3:17-cv-01605, 
(Apr. 2, 2018).  
 307. Oregon Saves retirement savings program announces new policy regarding em-
ployers already providing a retirement plan, EY (Nov. 1, 2018), https://taxnews.ey.com 
/news/2018-2183-oregon-saves-retirement-savings-program-announces-new-pol-
icy-regarding-employers-already-providing-a-retirement-plan.   
 308. See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.; EFAST-2 Welcome, https://www.efast.dol.gov/wel-
come.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).   
 309. Samuel Henson, Retirement Guidance:  Changes to State Mandatory IRAs Help 
Employers Comply, LOCKTON, https://www.lockton.com/whitepapers/Retirement 
_Guidance-State_Mandatory_IRAs-Aug18.final.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2019).  
 310. OregonSaves Reminder—Upcoming Registration Deadline, PAYLOCITY (Nov. 5, 
2018), https://www.paylocity.com/2018/11/05/oregonsaves-reminder-upcoming 
-registration-deadline/.   
 311. HJTA Complaint, supra note 121. 
 312. Id. at ¶ 2. 
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The complaint alleges that the California program is an employee 
benefit plan under ERISA.313 Specifically, it alleges the California pro-
gram is “a pension benefit plan or both a pension benefit plan and a 
welfare benefit plan” and thus an “‘employee benefit plan’ under 
ERISA.”314 The complaint, however, does not explain how the program 
is “established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organ-
ization.” In its brief in opposition of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, 
HJTA simply states, “[t]he CalSavers program is ‘offered by the Cali-
fornia Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust.’ (Cal. Gov. Code, 
§ 100000(b).) The Trust acts indirectly in the interest of employers, man-
dating private employer participation. That is enough to invoke 
ERISA.”315 As discussed above,316 a strong argument may be made that 
the California program is not an employee benefit plan under ERISA 
because it is not “established or maintained by an employer.”  
The complaint suggests that even if the California program is gen-
erally not an employee benefit plan for purposes of ERISA, it neces-
sarily is with respect to employers that establish plans when they have 
more than five employees and later have workforces that drop below 
five employees.317 The complaint cites the preamble to the now-disap-
proved 2016 regulatory safe harbor for this proposition.318 The pream-
ble does, in fact, indicate that in the DOL’s view, an employer will be 
considered to be participating in an employee benefit plan for purposes 
of ERISA if the employer voluntarily participates in an automatic en-
rollment IRA program established by the state.319 The preamble is not 
binding;320 it is only relevant to the extent that it is persuasive.   
According to the DOL’s views expressed in the preamble, an “em-
ployer, by choosing to participate in the state program, is effectively 
 
 313. Id. at ¶ 22. 
 314. Id. 
 315. HJTA Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 225, at 8. 
 316. See supra, Section III.A.3. 
 317. HJTA Complaint, supra note 121 at ¶ 24 (alleging that “[b]ecause CalSavers 
applies to employers of five or more employees, CalSavers subjects small businesses 
to administrative and legal turmoil should they have five or more employees ini-
tially, but later only four or fewer employees. Such employers automatically become 
ERISA plan administrators with all attendant administrative and legal liabilities.”).   
 318. Id. 
 319. Saving Arrangements Established by Qualified State Political Subdivisions 
for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 59, 464, 59,470 (Aug. 30, 2016). 
 320. See sources cited, supra note 189 (discussing deference that should be ac-
corded preambles).   
MOORE.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2019  1:06 PM 
NUMBER 1 ERISA PREEMPTION  107 
making plan design decisions that have direct consequences to its em-
ployees. Decisions subsumed in the employer’s choice include, for ex-
ample, the intended benefits, source of funding, funding medium, in-
vestment strategy, contribution amounts and limits, procedures to 
apply for and collect benefits, and forms of distribution.”321 The DOL’s 
view on this issue is not entirely persuasive. Undoubtedly, to the extent 
that an employer is not required by law to participate in a state auto-
matic enrollment IRA program, the employer’s decision to participate 
is voluntary.   
It is difficult to see, however, how the employer’s voluntary deci-
sion to participate in the program constitutes a decision with respect to 
investment strategy, contribution amounts and limits and related plan 
design decisions. Those decisions are made by the state, not the em-
ployer.  The only decision the employer can make is whether or not to 
participate in the program. The employer has no choice with respect to 
the terms of the program. Thus, the DOL’s view in the preamble to the 
now-disapproved 2016 regulatory safe harbor is not entirely persua-
sive, and it is not clear that an employer that chooses to continue to 
participate in a state automatic enrollment IRA program when the man-
date no longer applies should be considered to be participating in an 
employee benefit plan for purposes of ERISA.   
Moreover, even if the preamble is found to be persuasive, the pre-
amble does not clearly establish that employers with fewer than five 
employees would necessarily operate employee benefit plans for pur-
poses of ERISA. Instead, the preamble asserts that state laws with small 
employer exemptions raise challenging problems for employers with 
fluctuating workforces that states can resolve in a variety of ways, in-
cluding requiring employers to continue to keep employees enrolled in 
the program and thus continuing to fall within the mandate.322 Accord-
ing to the preamble, only if the law does not require employers to con-
tinue to operate state-mandated automatic enrollment IRA programs 
when their workforce drops below five employees does the law neces-
sarily cause plans with fewer than five employees to be employee ben-
efit plans for purposes of ERISA.323 
 
 321. Saving Arrangements Established by Qualified State Political Subdivisions 
for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. at 59,470.   
 322. Saving Arrangements Established by Qualified State Political Subdivisions 
for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,464, 59,471. 
 323. Id.   
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At the time this Article was written, neither the California statute 
nor the regulations required an employer with fewer than five employ-
ees to continue to participate in the program.324 Because the current 
statute and implementing regulations do not require an employer with 
a fluctuating workforce that drops below five employees to continue to 
participate in the program, continued participation by such an em-
ployer arguably constitutes participation in an employee benefit plan 
for purposes of ERISA with respect to that employer.  Because ERISA 
preempts state law that relates to employee benefit plans, to the extent 
that participation by an employer with fewer than five employees con-
stitutes an employee benefit plan, ERISA preempts California’s law 
with respect to that participation. Preemption itself, however, is hardly 
significantly because ERISA would simply preempt the state law that 
did not require the employer to automatically enroll its employees in 
the program in the first place.   
More significantly, according to the preamble to the 2016 regula-
tory safe harbor, participation in the California Program by an em-
ployer with fewer than five employees constitutes participation in an 
employee benefit program with respect to the employer, and ERISA’s 
reporting and disclosure, vesting, and fiduciary provisions apply with 
respect to that employer. Applying ERISA’s protections solely with re-
spect to employers that are not required to participate in the program 
could create an administrative quagmire. The California policymakers 
may wish to avert this potential problem by amending the California 
program to require employers to continue to participate in the program 
even if their workforce drops below five employees. 
VI.  Conclusion 
Despite the fact that Congress has disapproved a 2016 regulatory 
safe harbor providing that state automatic enrollment IRA programs 
are not employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA if they satisfy the 
eleven requirements set forth in the regulation, the five states that have 
enacted legislation creating state automatic enrollment IRA programs 
have indicated that they will proceed with their implementation of the 
 
 324. Cf. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100000(d)(l) (West 2018) (defining eligible employer 
as employer that, among other things, has five or more employees); CAL. CODE 
REGS. tit. 10 § 100001(c) (2018) (requiring participating employers that cease to be 
eligible employers to notify program within thirty days).   
MOORE.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2019  1:06 PM 
NUMBER 1 ERISA PREEMPTION  109 
programs. Indeed, two states, Oregon and Illinois, are well into the im-
plementation process.   
In light of the disapproval of the 2016 regulatory safe harbor, there 
is a serious question as to whether the state automatic enrollment IRA 
programs are preempted by ERISA. Focusing on the purpose of a reg-
ulatory safe harbor for traditional IRA payroll plans, a strong argument 
can be made that the state programs are not employee benefit plans for 
purposes of ERISA because they fall within the purpose of the safe har-
bor. On the other hand, interpreting state-mandated automatic enroll-
ment IRA programs to fall within the purpose of the safe harbor con-
tradicts the plain meaning of the term “completely voluntary,” one of 
the requirements of the safe harbor. Moreover, the purpose of the reg-
ulation suggests that automatic enrollment IRAs voluntarily estab-
lished by employers should not fall within the safe harbor, and it may 
be difficult to justify interpreting the term “completely voluntary” dif-
ferently for state-mandated automatic enrollment IRA plans and vol-
untary employer-established automatic enrollment IRA programs. Ac-
cordingly, a strong argument can be made that state automatic 
enrollment IRAs should not fall within the protection of the safe harbor 
for traditional IRA payroll plans. 
Even if state-mandated automatic enrollment IRA programs are 
not entitled to protection under the regulatory safe harbor for tradi-
tional payroll IRAs, that does not necessarily mean they are employee 
benefit plans for purposes of ERISA. Rather, a strong argument can be 
made that the mandated programs are not employee benefit plans 
based on the plain meaning of ERISA’s definition of employee benefit 
plans, the plain language of the state statutes creating the mandatory 
automatic enrollment IRA programs, and ERISA’s purpose of protect-
ing against employer mismanagement of accumulated funds in em-
ployee benefit plans.   
Even if state-mandated automatic enrollment IRA programs are 
not employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA, there is a serious 
question as to whether the programs “relate to” employee benefit plans 
and thus are preempted by ERISA. A strong argument can be made that 
none of the state statutes act exclusively upon ERISA-covered plans and 
thus none of the statutes are preempted under the first “reference to” 
prong of the “relate to” prohibition. In addition, as currently structured, 
the state automatic enrollment IRA programs do not appear to violate 
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the second “connection with” prong of the “relate to” prohibition be-
cause the state laws do not appear to have any impact on the terms of 
employee benefit plans. They may encourage employers to establish 
employee benefit plans in order to avoid the mandate and thus have an 
impact on the number of employee benefit plans employers elect to es-
tablish. They are, however, unlikely to have an impact on the terms of 
employer-sponsored employee benefit plans. 
Nevertheless, particular aspects of the state-mandated automatic 
enrollment IRA programs may be preempted by ERISA. First, a strong 
argument may be made that any state-imposed reporting requirement 
impermissibly relates to employee benefit plans and thus is preempted 
by ERISA. Second, the Department of Labor’s reasoning in the pream-
ble to the 2016 regulatory safe harbor suggests that an employer that 
voluntarily participates in a state automatic enrollment IRA program 
creates an employee benefit plan for purposes of ERISA, and thus, the 
state automatic enrollment IRA program, at least with respect to that 
employer, may be preempted by ERISA. 
States can avoid the reporting issues by automatically exempting 
employers that have filed Form 5500s, as Oregon has. States can avoid 
the problem of the inadvertent creation of employee benefit plans by 
small employers not subject to the mandate by either (1) requiring all 
employers, regardless of size, to participate in the automatic enrollment 
IRA program, or (2) requiring an employer, once subject to the man-
date, to always participate in the program regardless of its size.  Either 
of these requirements could reduce the risk of small employers that are 
not subject to the mandate participating in the program creating, inten-
tionally or unintentionally, employee benefit plans subject to ERISA. 
 
Postscript 
On March 29, 2019, the district court granted California Secure 
Choice Retirement Savings Program’s (“CalSavers”) motion to dismiss 
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association’s complaint alleging that CalSav-
ers is preempted by ERISA.325  
The court first considered whether CalSavers satisfied the regula-
tory safe harbor for individual retirement accounts.326 The court noted 
 
 325. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. California Secure Choice Retire-
ment Savings Program, 2019 WL 1430113 (E.D. Ca.). For an analysis of the argu-
ments presented in the complaint, see supra Section IV.B. 
 326. This safe harbor, 29 C.F.R. 2510.3-2(d), is discussed supra, Section III.A.2.  
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that HJTA relied exclusively on the Department of Labor’s preamble to 
the 2016 safe harbor for state automatic enrollment IRA programs to 
argue that CalSavers does not satisfy the “completely voluntary” re-
quirement of the safe harbor.327 The court recognized that “[a]n 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is given significant defer-
ence,” but that “in repealing the 2016 [s]afe [h]arbor pursuant to the 
Congressional Review Act, Congress repealed the DOL’s interpretation 
of the matters at issue here, making congressional intent more diffi-
cult.”328 “[B]ased on the record as a whole,” the court declined to hold 
that CalSavers satisfied the regulatory safe harbor for individual retire-
ment accounts.329 
The court did not stop with the safe harbor. Instead, it looked to 
the underlying purposes of ERISA to find that CalSavers was not 
preempted by ERISA.330 Specifically, the court began by quoting a re-
cent Ninth Circuit decision, Board of Trustees of the Glazing Health & Wel-
fare Trust v. Chambers,331 which cited the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.332 for the proposition that “under the 
modern approach a state law is not preempted merely because it has a 
literal ‘connection with’ an ERISA plan . . . Instead, the law must actu-
ally ‘govern[ ] . . . a central matter of plan administration’ or ‘interfere[ ] 
with nationally uniform plan administration.’”333 The court declared 
that “because [CalSavers] only applies to employers without existing 
retirement plans, no ERISA plans are ‘governed’ or ‘interfered’ with be-
cause of the statute.”334 
The court identified ERISA’s primary purposes as (1) protecting 
employees’ interests in receiving benefits promised by an employer, 
and (2) protecting employers from the burdens of meeting multiple reg-
ulatory requirements in the management of ERISA plans.335 With re-
spect to these two purposes, the court first noted that employers are not 
 
 327. California Secure Choice, 2019 WL 1430113 at *7. 
 328. Id.  
 329. Id.  
 330. Id. at *7–*8.   
 331. Board of the Trustees of the Glazing Health & Welfare Trust v. Chambers, 
903 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2018).  
 332. Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016). For a discussion of 
Gobeille, see supra pp. 144–45 and 152–53.   
 333. Chambers, 903 F.3d at 847 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).    
 334. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. California Secure Choice Retire-
ment Savings Program, 2019 WL 1430113, *7 (E.D. Ca.).  
 335. Id.   
MOORE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2019  1:06 PM 
112 The Elder Law Journal VOLUME 27 
required to make any promises to employees, and found that the em-
ployers’ ministerial duties of remitting payroll deducted payments to 
CalSavers fall outside the scope of conduct Congress intended to regu-
late in ERISA.336 The court thus declared that the “[f]inding that ERISA 
preempts CalSavers would be out-of-step with the underlying pur-
poses of the Act. CalSavers does not govern a central matter of an 
ERISA plan’s administration, nor does it interfere with nationally uni-
form plan administration.”337  
Recognizing the importance of the case, the court offered HJTA 
leave to amend the complaint within twenty days.338 On April 11, 2019, 
HJTA filed an amended complaint.339 The amended complaint alleges 
that CalSavers is “an ERISA plan and/or set of ERISA plans under Do-
novan v. Dillingham.”340 The complaint further alleges that CalSavers is 
established and maintained by employers and identifies the employers 
to include the CalSavers Board, the CalSavers Trust, and “the actual 
employers.”341 The complaint points to CalSavers’ promotional video 
and Employer website in support of this allegation.342 Specifically, the 
complaint alleges that “[t]he video and Employer website admit that 
actual employers ‘offer’ and ‘maintain’ the Program (or plans). The vid-
eos and website express that the employers will be more than ministe-
rial . . . . Thus CalSavers is either one ERISA plan where the Board 
and/or Trust is statutory ERISA ‘Employer’—or—CalSavers requires 
the actual employers to create thousands of separate ERISA plans.”343 
The amended complaint further alleges that “[t]he CalSavers 
mandate (with penalty) also conflicts with ERISA by mandating private 
employee benefit structures, interfering with employer autonomy to 
postpone or select other options valid under ERISA . . . . Under CalSav-
ers, California employers lose options which should remain available 
under ERISA’s federal guidelines, such as to designate one or more of 
the many private IRA sponsors on their own pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 
25099-1(d).”344 Thus, in essence, the amended complaint further alleges 
 
 336. Id.   
 337. Id.   
 338. Id.   
 339. First Amended Complaint, Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. Cal. Secure 
Choice Ret. Sav. Program, No. 2:18-cv-01584 (April 11, 2019).  
 340. Id. at ¶ 20. For a discussion of Donovan v. Dillingham, see supra note 220.  
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. at ¶ 24.  
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that because the California law does exempt employers that offer their 
employees the opportunity to enroll in payroll deduction IRAs, which 
are not employee benefit plans for the purposes of ERISA under the 
regulatory safe harbor for IRAs, 345 CalSavers is preempted by ERISA.  
  
 
 345. 29 C.F.R. 2510.3-2(d). For a discussion of the requirements of this safe har-
bor, see supra Section III.A.2.a.  
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